University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Computer Science and Engineering: Theses,
Dissertations, and Student Research

Computer Science and Engineering, Department of

Summer 7-1-2014

INVARIANT INFERRING AND
MONITORING IN ROBOTIC SYSTEMS
Hengle Jiang
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jianghengle@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss
Part of the Robotics Commons
Jiang, Hengle, "INVARIANT INFERRING AND MONITORING IN ROBOTIC SYSTEMS" (2014). Computer Science and
Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research. 79.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/computerscidiss/79

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science and Engineering: Theses, Dissertations, and Student Research by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

INVARIANT INFERRING AND MONITORING IN ROBOTIC SYSTEMS

by

Hengle Jiang

A THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfilment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science

Major: Computer Science

Under the Supervision of Professor Sebastian Elbaum

Lincoln, Nebraska
May, 2014

INVARIANT INFERRING AND MONITORING IN ROBOTIC SYSTEMS
Hengle Jiang, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2014
Adviser: Sebastian Elbaum
System monitoring can help to detect abnormalities and avoid failures. Crafting
monitors for today’s robotic systems, however, can be very difficult due to the
systems’ inherent complexity and its rich operating environment.
In this work we address this challenge through an approach that automatically
infers system invariants and synthesizes those invariants into monitors. This
approach is inspired by existing software engineering approaches for automated
invariant inference, and it is novel in that it derives invariants by observing the
messages passed between system nodes and the invariants types are tailored to
match the spatial, time, temporal, and architectural attributes of robotic systems.
Further, our approach automatically classifies and synthesizes invariants into
a monitor node that can be seamlessly integrated into systems built on top of
publish-subscribe architectures. The monitor can be also tailored to trigger actions
when an invariant is violated. We have assessed the approach in the context of
three UAV systems to better understand its potential. In our case study, we found
that invariants can be useful for developers and that the synthesized monitor can
reduce system failure rate when facing unexpected faults from 76.2% to 10.6%.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Monitoring a system for anomalies is a common approach to detect conditions
that may lead to failures and to take corrective actions. Such monitors must be
carefully crafted by engineers with the domain knowledge to understand what
could constitute abnormal behavior. This process becomes increasingly challenging
as the monitored system and its operating environment grow in complexity.
Consider, for example, the scenario illustrated in Figure 1.1 where a small
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is autonomously following and attempting to
land on a moving platform whose location is continuously fed to the UAV. A
typical landing test consists of placing the UAV starting a few meters away from
the platform, finding and following the moving platform, and then initiating the
landing sequence. Using a message passing system middleware such as ROS
(Robot Operating System)[12], an implementation of this system contains several
distributed processes that communicate through dozens of message channels.
An engineer developing a monitor to detect anomalies for this kind of system
is likely to focus on a small subset of variables and relationships between variables.
For example, a monitor crafted for this system would likely check whether the
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Figure 1.1: UAV attempting to land on moving platform.

positions of the UAV and the platform are aligned when landing is initiated,
and whether the speed of the platform is less than a safe maximum. There are,
however, many other aspects of the system worth monitoring that are more subtle
and may not be considered by the engineer given the number of variables and
relationships involved. For example, it may help to ensure that the platform is
horizontal and not rotating when landing, the UAV’s angles are not greater than
a multiple of the UAV’s commanded velocity, there is only one landing platform
reporting its location, and the platform is unoccupied and able to support the
weight of the UAV. In addition, the UAV operating in different scenarios may carry
varied safe conditions. For instance, the safe angle of the UAV flying in a no-wind
environment is quite different from it in a strong-wind environment. Similarly,
when the platform is moving on different types of terrain, the UAV’s safe landing
conditions are quite different.
As the system complexity increases, it is unlikely that the engineer will consider
all possible variables or relationships in all scenarios. To alleviate this challenge,
we propose an approach to automate the synthesis of monitors from the traces
gathered by this type of distributed system operating a robot.
Our approach is inspired by existing software engineering approaches for

3
automated invariant inference[18]. The core idea of this type of approach is to
infer system invariants from traces collected during system execution, iteratively
instantiating potential invariants from a set of invariant templates utilizing the
trace values, and dropping or refining the ones that are falsified by other trace
values.
For example, given a template invariant varX ≥ constant and a trace of six
variable-value pairs collected from time t1 to time t6, tr = {t1 : a = 1, t2 : b =
3, t3 : a = 1, t4 : a = 2, t5 : a = 1, t6 : a = −1}, the approach would instantiate the
invariant template as a ≥ 1 after reading the value of a at t1 and further support
it until t6 when value a = −1 is observed. Then it becomes necessary to refine
the invariant to a ≥ −1. For variable b an invariant may not be reported as there
may not be enough values to support that instantiation. Given a set of traces, the
inferred invariants provide a characterization of the behavior of the system as
exhibited in those traces, and can be the basis for determining what to monitor
and what is an anomaly.
Existing techniques to automatically infer invariants have been shown useful
for generating generic invariants like the one illustrated above to act primarily as a
function’s pre and post conditions. The application of these techniques to large
distributed robotic systems, however, has been limited. We conjecture that this
is due to the focus on the generation of low level invariants which is impractical
for these large systems, the lack of domain-specific invariants that capture the
temporal and spatial aspects of robotic systems, and the lack of tools to seamlessly
integrate such approaches into the development process and common toolsets. In
this work we set out to tackle these challenges.
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1.1 Approach Overview
The goal of our approach is to enable the automatic generation of system monitors
that can detect anomalous behavior and launch counter-measures. The type of
system we target is a robotic system made of distributed nodes that sense, actuate,
and communicate through some form of message passing scheme. Our work
was motivated and implemented in the context of ROS [12], but the approach is
generalizable to other similar message passing infrastructures, as well as service
oriented architectures. (e.g., LCM [5], Microsoft Robotics Developer Studio [6] ,
CLARAty [2]). Note that we operate at the granularity of messages commonly
used by robotic systems operating under a publish and subscribe architecture.
This reduces the monitoring overhead and it lets us infer properties related not
just to program states, but also to message sequences, which are critical to robotic
systems.
Figure 1.2 provides an overview of the approach, which is conceptually similar
to what is currently performed by existing dynamic invariant inference frameworks
[18, 19, 20, 28]; we have highlighted the differences by bolding certain components’
labels.
As shown in Figure 1.2, system S, a configuration file(CFG) and a training
set TS, serve as the only inputs to the approach, and the whole workflow can
be separated into two parts: Invariant Inference and Monitor Synthesis. In the
first part, S is instrumented to capture the messages passed between the nodes
in the system, constituting system S0 . When S0 is executed with the training
set TS, a set of | TS| traces(Traces) is generated, where each trace will contain a
sequence of variable-value pairs found in the messages. The approach will then
attempt to instantiate the predefined invariant templates based on the information
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Figure 1.2: The whole workflow

found in Traces and CFG. Each instantiated invariant is a boolean expression
that characterizes the variables values observed in Traces. In the second part, the
invariants are further pruned with data traces based on their classifiers’ capabilities.
Then, the invariants are synthesized into a monitor that can be incorporated into
the system S.

1.2 Thesis Structure
Through this work we aim to make automated invariant inference techniques
amenable to robotic systems. Our main contributions are:
• With just message passing channels instrumentation, our approach captures
critical information in robotic systems, and organizes them into data traces
in a way to enable more interesting invariant inference.
• We have developed invariant templates that account for properties that are
deemed important in the context of robotic systems, such as those characterizing the relationship between variables that have a continuous distribution
such as sensors values, those including a time component to capture the
derivatives of raw variable values, those that can differentiate among system
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operating modes, those characterizing the architecture of the robotic system,
and those capturing temporal properties of the program behaviors.
• We have implemented a version of the approach that automatically classifies and synthesizes invariants into a monitor node that can be seamlessly
integrated into existing ROS systems. The monitor can be tailored to trigger
actions when an invariant is violated.
• We have assessed the approach in the context of three UAV systems to better
understand its potential. In our experiments, we found that the monitor
can reduce system failure rate when facing unexpected scenarios from 76.2%
to 10.6%. In addition, it also can be used to check user expectations and
assumptions. The new developed invariant templates have potentials to
detect subtle problems in Robotic Systems.
The thesis is organized into the following chapters. In Chapter 2 we will
introduce the background and the related work. In Chapter 3 we will describe
how we perform Invariant Inference, including program instrumentation, trace
generation, and invariants templates. In Chapter 4, we will discuss our Monitor
Synthesis, including invariant classification and monitor generation. In Chapter 5,
we present three case studies to evaluate our approach. In Chapter 6, we conclude
and discuss future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Our work aims to enable the automatic generation of system invariant monitors
that can detect anomalous behavior in distributed robotic operating systems. Since
we implemented our tool specifically on ROS (Robotic Operating System), we first
introduce the background of this robotic system, and then explore the related work
in three contexts: invariant detection and monitoring, robot execution monitoring,
and distributed system debugging. A summary of the related work is described in
Table 2.1.

2.1 ROS
ROS[12] is a software framework for robot software development, which provides
operating system-like functionality on a heterogeneous computer cluster. It is
based on a graph architecture where processing takes place in nodes that may
receive, post and multiplex sensor, control, state, planning, actuator and other
messages.
Figure 2.1 shows a publish/subscribe graph view of a ROS program, where
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Context

Other Approaches
Powerful invariant inference engine and framework; sophisticated toolset with multiple front
ends and extension capabilities.
DIDUCE[28] Online invariant inference and
monitoring on Java bytecode; simple invariant templates on one
variable or expression.
PRECIS[34] Invariant inference only; clusters
variable’s values by path information in terms of predicate words;
needs to access source code.
Invariant
DySy[15]
Invariant inference only; uses siInference
multaneous symbolic execution to
and moniget more abstract and general intoring
variants; needs to access source
code.
Javert[20]
Mines small generic temporal patterns from event sequences and
composes them to construct large,
complex patterns.
GKGenerates extended finite state
tail[16]
machines (EFSMs, annotating
FSM edges with transition conditions on data values) from interaction traces.
GSOLR[23, Model-based analytical approach;
24]
uses reachability analysis to guarantee safety against worst-case
disturbances.
Robotic
SelfData-driven approach; detects
Execution Awareness faults based on the inherent dyMonitorModel[25, namics of inter-component coming
26]
munication.
Real-time Uses model-based diagnosis for
Diagfault detection and localization,
nosis
& and a repair module executes an
Repair[22] appropriate action to recover the
system from the fault.
Distributed Pip[35]
Accepts expectations in a declarSystem
ative language from users; logs
Debugactual system behaviors and exging
plores expected and unexpected
behaviors.
Daikon[18,
19]

Our Approach
Built on Daikon’s framework;
richer
invariant
templates;
Daikon’s front end for ROS.
Offline invariant inference and
runtime monitoring on robotic
systems; richer invariant templates.
Invariant monitoring also; simply clusters data by enumerable
variables; does not need to access
source code.
Invariant monitoring also; no
static analysis; does not need to
access source code.

Infers temporal invariants like
ordered-pair intervals, which is
a simple but effective temporal
property for robotic systems.
Only detects the existence of event
patterns in the form of regular expressions defined by users.

Data-driven approach; learns system properties and enforces these
properties.
Data-driven approach; detects
faults based on both temporal
and state properties of intercomponent communication.
Localizes faults on topics or services; monitor can take isolation
or other recovery action.

Infers and enforces structure and
performance specifications.

Table 2.1: Comparison of our approach and others
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Figure 2.1: Graph view of a ROS program

ellipses represent nodes and directed edges are communication channels (publish/subscribe) between nodes. Nodes are the basic elements in a ROS program,
and each node is simply a process launched in a ROS system. Nodes can communicate with each other through two mechanisms: topic and service. A topic
works like a message bus, where nodes can publish to and subscribe from, while
the messages published on topics are just user defined data structures. As shown
in Figure 2.1 the label on the edge is the topic name, and the edge starts from
the publisher who will publish message to the topic, and ends to the subscriber
who will subscribe message from the topic. Note that multiple nodes can publish
or subscribe to one topic, so that topic may build multiple communications. On
the contrary, a service can only be provided by one server node at a time, and
the client nodes can communicate with the server node by calling the service. All
these communications are registered and directed by a ROS master node.
ROS also provides several ways to configure the program at launch time and
runtime. The sample XML-format launch file in Figure 2.2 can configure and
deploy multiple nodes with particular arguments and parameters at launch time.
The launch file makes the ROS program more flexible since it enables launching
multiple nodes from one package, remap resource names (node, topic, service
and parameter) and set parameters. For example, in Figure 2.2 six nodes would
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Figure 2.2: Launch file of a ROS program

be launched together explicitly. The first node conv gps pose launched from an
executable file vicon pose in vicon pose package. Inside the scope of this node, the
resources it refers as subject name would be remapped to a new name car pose.
And it also sets a string parameter object with the value of “car”. In addition, the
ROS parameter server also provides a way to access and change parameters at
runtime.

2.2 Invariant Inference and monitoring
Our work was inspired in part by the evolution and maturity gained by techniques
and tools available to infer likely program invariants. Our technique and tool
build specifically on Daikon[18, 19], one of the pioneer approaches with probably
the most sophisticated toolset openly available. The likely invariants produced by
Daikon are a dynamically-generated analogue of a program specification, which
is valuable in software testing, debugging and verification. We discuss Daikon in
more detail in Section 3.1.
Among invariant monitoring, DIDUCE[28] was the first work to use invariants
for runtime monitoring and diagnosis, which is similar to our work. DIDUCE
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needs to instrument java bytecode, focuses on program states at particular program
points (procedure calls and heap accesses), and relaxes invariants or reports to
users when detecting anomalies. Instead, our approach, operating in the context of
message-passing and service-oriented architectures supporting distributed robotic
systems, does not instrument the program source code, but just focuses on messages to detect system anomalies by richer types of invariants, and takes corrective
measures (like interrupting the message passing) to prevent system crashes.
Still, several other complementary efforts have emerged in the last few years,
ranging from refining state invariants to temporal and behavioral model inferences[20,
40, 15, 34]. To improve invariant generation, researchers have taken advantage of
static analysis to guide the dynamic invariant inference. For example, PRECIS[34]
proposed generating invariants through program path guided clustering. Their
approach records inputs and outputs together with predicates for branch conditions, and uses linear regression on inputs and outputs grouped by predicate
words to infer path invariants. DySy[15] uses symbolic execution to infer more
general invariants, as it combines concrete executions of actual test cases with
simultaneous symbolic executions of the same tests to produces abstract conditions
as program invariants. In our work, we did not apply static or symbolic analysis,
because we are facing large scale distributed robotic systems instead of a class
or a function. Consequently, our approach is a purely based on traces without
any dependence on source code. However, to extend the power of Daikon, we
also use a cluster analysis on the trace data to generate conditional invariants (see
Section 3.6).
Temporal invariants represent some rules on events’ order. Javert[20] is one tool
that can extract and compose temporal patterns from event traces, and its extension
allows for simultaneously learning and enforcing general temporal properties over
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method call sequences[21]. We have also implemented such temporal invariant
inference on publishing messages and calling services. We specifically infer the
ordered-pair interval invariant, which tells that an event always happens after
another event within certain time and events happening in the interval.
In terms of behavioral model inference, researchers have focused on interactions
between components, and the results are usually in the form of finite state machines
(FSM). Lorenzoli et al. have developed a dynamic analysis algorithm called GK-tail
combining the ideas of invariant detection and temporal property mining[16]. The
result of this kind of inference is a extended finite state machines (EFSMs). In our
approach, we can also detect existence of event patterns in the form of regular
expressions defined by users. However, we did not yet explore FSM or EFSMs
inference in this work.

2.3 Robot Execution Monitoring
In the context of robotic systems, monitoring for error detection is a well known
area [38]. The potential for missing information, unreliable and imprecise sensors,
and the stochastic nature of the operating environment often makes monitors a
necessity. Existing efforts can be categorized into model-based or data-driven,
based on how to build the system model (invariants in our approach) to detect
anomalies.
Model-based approaches follow either an analytical or knowledge-based method,
where developers model each state beforehand and use this model to estimate the
current system state (i.e., normal or faulty). Analytical approaches are commonly
used in the design of control systems, where the models are constructed based on
fundamental assumptions. They are precise and mostly targeted at problems fairly

13
close to the hardware as well as to the raw sensor data.
In the context of quad rotors similar to the ones we used in our study, there
have been several recent efforts that attempt to detect anomalies by model-based
approaches. For example, Gillula and Tomlin[23] proposed a framework using
reachability analysis in a way that prevents the control system from taking an
unsafe action. They further proposed an adapted form of their approach called
GSOLR by modeling the worst-case disturbance state-dependent manner learned
online[24].
The data-driven approach does not need a model beforehand; instead it tries to
infer an abstract model (usually a statistical model) of the original system from
the data, and uses the inferred model to detect faults. Golombek and Wrede et
al. presented a so-called self-awareness model [25, 26]. It also requires a messagepassing robotic systems, and it maps each system’s internal data exchange to
an event (such as Component1 updates sensorA on Component2). And then it
infers a probabilistic model on the event sequences, which is the histogram of
the interval time between any two events, by which it could detect many errors,
such as component failure, resource starvation and asynchronous communication.
Our approach also infers such temporal invariants as the ordered-paired interval
invariant (see Section 3.4.4.1), which captures not only the time but also the events
happening in the interval. Besides temporal properties, our approach also captures
a variety of state properties.
After an anomaly is detected, existing efforts have been designed to perform
diagnosis and remediation based on models defined by domain experts. Steinbauer
and Morth presented a solution for real-time fault detection and repair of control
softwares of autonomous robots[22]. Their diagnosis system uses model-based
diagnosis for fault detection and localization, and a repair module executes an
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appropriate action to recover the system from the fault.
Our approach is complementary to these approaches, and unique in that it can
generate more general invariants that were not considered by domain experts, not
defined by simple statistics, and that may be relevant to many robotic systems as
they are instantiated by a training set. Furthermore, the implementation within
ROS makes it directly applicable to a large set of existing robotic systems.

2.4 Distributed System Debugging
In distributed system debugging, developers usually focus on two kinds of bugs:
structure bug and performance bug[35]. A structural bug results in processing
or communication happening at the wrong place or in the wrong order. Most of
these approaches[35, 36, 32] collect event sequences as causal paths, and check
expectations or anomalies as errors. Inspired by their approaches, we build our
structure invariants as architecture invariants (see Section 3.4.3), which indicate the
correct communication model of the ROS programs. However, our approach does
not collect causal paths driven by events, but simply records the publish/subscribe
architectures and infers the invariants. Compared to their approach, ours relies
less on the program instrumentation and the behavior expectation.
The performance bugs result in processing consumes too much or too little of
some important resources, for example time. The measure of the performance also
depends on the causal paths collected [35, 31, 36, 32]. Our approach also records
and infers some invariants of system performance. For example, we record ROS
service calls and infer invariants on the response delay (see Section 3.4.1). Another
performance measure is message latency(see Section 3.4.1), which constrains the
delay between publish and subscribe.
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Chapter 3
Invariant Inference
In this chapter, we will describe the invariant inference process in detail, which
is the core part of our approach. As shown in Figure 1.2, the input is a system,
a training set and a configuration file, and the output is a set of invariants. The
invariant inference process can be divided into three steps: the first step enables
the generation of data traces, the second is translating the data traces to feed the
extended invariant inference engine Daikon, and the third is the actual invariant
inference. The goal of this process is generating as many as possible meaningful
and useful invariants, while suppressing trivial or redundant invariants. To achieve
this goal, we enrich the sources of information of the data traces in the first step.
Then, we organize the data trace in a way that Daikon can capture more interesting
invariants. For the last step, we develop new invariant templates to increase
the power of the inference process. In the following sections, we will illustrate
these steps in more detail. We start with describing the invariant inference engine
Daikon, on which we base our work.
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3.1 Extending Daikon
Daikon is an implementation of dynamic detection of likely invariants. It provides
a flexible framework with a sophisticated toolset for invariant inference. The
framework of Daikon is shown in Figure 3.1. Daikon provides several languagespecific front-end tools for program instrumentation and an extensible invariant
template set. A front-end tool puts probes in the target program (more specifically
at methods’ entries and exits), and creates a .decl [3] file containing the declarations
of the program points and the variables associated with them. During execution,
these probes output variables’ values on their program points to the data traces in
Daikon’s input format (.dtrace files [3]). At inference time, the invariant templates
are used to initialize and check the invariants on the data trace, and developers
can extend this template set. Generally, the inference engine follows these steps:
• Given variables declared in the .decl file and Daikon’s parameters in the
settings file, it initializes all possible invariants on the variables based on the
invariant templates;
• It reads the data from the .dtrace file, checks all the invariants initialized in
the first step, and dismisses or refines them if the data in the trace violates
them;
• After finishing reading all the trace data, it filters out unjustified or redundant invariants based on the settings, and finally outputs all the invariants
remaining.
Our work builds specifically on Daikon in the context of ROS. From the perspective of Daikon’s framework, we have built a ROS front end, as we have tailored
Daikon for ROS and develop new invariant templates.
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Figure 3.1: Daikon Framework

Figure 3.2: Invariant Inference Work Flow

Figure 3.2 shows the inference workflow of our approach which extends
Daikon’s framework. To get the invariants, our approach needs to go through three
steps: trace generation, trace translation, and invariant inference. First, the target
program’s executions are recorded into traces, then our approach translates these
traces into Daikon’s trace format, and finally Daikon uses our extended invariant
templates to infer and output the invariants.
The inference process can be configured by a XML-format configuration file
as shown in Figure 3.3, in which the scope tag defines how the messages will be
extracted and organized, and the detect tag tells where to find the original data files.
Our approach works at the granularity of messages, so the scope tag defines the
sources (like topics in ROS system) we want to extract messages from and how to
organize these messages into data traces. The scope tag also declares the inference
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Figure 3.3: Inference Part of a Configuration File

of other two kinds of invariants: architecture invariants and temporal invariants,
which will be described in the following sections. The detect tag indicates the
training data set ( specifically the bags files of the ROS system ) for the invariant
inference. We will explain these in detail shortly.
We contribute three key extensions. First, we perform data capture at the level
of the structured messages that are sent between ROS nodes. We observed that
these higher level messages cause less overhead while still providing a rich enough
data set from which to generate invariants on a per-topic level. Another advantage
of this shift is that we can use a common ROS tool called rosbag to record most data
without instrumenting the program, which means we can avoid instrumenting
and adding overhead to complex source code. For some particular invariants
(service call and architecture) we still need to add a node to retrieve the desired
information, but we can do it through the modification of the program’s launch
file without instrumenting the source code. Second, we group messages according
to their topics in the publish/subscribe graph, which helps to capture interesting
properties across multiple topics. Third, we extend the invariant template set with
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four new invariants: time-related, polygon, architecture, and temporal, which are
particularly useful in Robotic Systems. Plus, we extend the invariant justification
procedure of our new polygon invariants, which can help when the polygon
invariants grow explosively. We also implement a simple cluster method to infer
more precise invariants on separate sub traces.

3.2 Trace Generation
As mentioned before, we perform data capture at the level of the structured
messages that are sent between the ROS nodes. While avoiding source code
instrumentation, it provides a rich enough data set for invariant inference. The
goal of trace generation is collecting all relevant data into traces. In addition to the
normal messages communicated between nodes, our approach enriches the traces
by collecting service messages, ROS parameters, and ROS architecture. All that
special information also goes into messages to be recorded.
We want each message in the generated traces to include the time stamp, the
message type, the message value, and the source of the message (topic). ROS’s
rosbag tool meets our requirements to capture the messages published through
topics, but it misses information from other sources such as service messages, ROS
parameters, and ROS architectures, so we need to extend message traces with an
additional node that we call the recording node.
Services provide another way for nodes to communicate with each other.
However, capturing service invocations is challenging, because a ROS service
works like a point-to-point private communication between nodes. In order to
record service usages, our approach has to intercept the service connection. It
first needs to query the ROS master node to get all the services. Second, for each
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Figure 3.4: Example of remapping service

service, our approach remaps it to a new service name for all its server nodes.
Third, the recording node provides the original services by relaying the request and
response messages between the client and the real server. As shown in Figure 3.4,
in the original system, the client node calls a service named /s1 on the server node.
Our approach remaps the service with another name /rec/s1 for the server node,
and makes the recording node relay the service. In this way, every time a service
is called, the recording node publishes the service messages including the request
and response messages, the client node, the real server node and the response
time, and the rosbag tool records the service message into the trace. This service
relaying introduces addition response delay.
ROS parameters work like system environment variables for ROS systems. For
the system in Figure 5.15, we can use global parameters to declare the initial GPS
coordinates, and the nodes’ private parameters can configure the nodes behavior
like message publishing rate. To collect them, as shown in Figure 3.5 our recording
node queries the master to get all the parameters which have been set on the
parameter server, and then publishes them to the special parameter topic. It
performs the query at a configurable time interval, and if any parameter has been
changed, it republishes the parameter with the updated value. In this way, our
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Figure 3.5: Architecture and Parameter recording

approach records them into the trace through the rosbag tool.
The system architecture is important information to collect, which indicates
the nodes’ publish and subscribe structure represented by a graph of nodes and
topics or services, as will be addressed shortly in Section 3.4.3. The architectural
information is recorded by the recording node as shown in Figure 3.5, which
queries the ROS master to get the current architecture (topic and service), and then
publishes the information to the architecture topic, which is recorded by the rosbag
tool. The recording node takes a snapshot of the architecture at a configurable
time interval, and if this snapshot is different from the previous one, it publishes
the new architecture. The topic architecture information is presented as a map
of topics to publishers and subscribers: {topic1 : { pubs : { pub1, pub2, . . .}, subs :

{sub1, sub2, . . .}}, . . .}; while the service architecture information is just a map of
services to servers: {service1 : server1, service2 : server2, . . .}.

3.3 Trace Translation
The goal of the trace translation step is translating the messages in bag files
into Daikon’s format. Moreover, it organizes the data to let Daikon infer more
interesting invariants.
Variables in Daikon’s format must be grouped by locality also known as
program points. For example, method entry and exit points are considered
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program points by Daikon’s inference engine. Only variables at the same program
point are analyzed together to compute invariants. For example, Daikon would
infer the relationship between the variables x1 and x2 on the entry point of method
A, but it would never infer any relationship between x1 or x2 at entry point of
method A and the variable y at entry point of method B. In our case, we do not
explicitly have program points in terms of methods’ entries or exits; however, we
have processing nodes and topics. Our approach clusters topic messages consumed
and published by a node to identify invariants for the node. The idea is that the
entry values in the messages consumed by a node are likely to define its behavior
and affect its outputs as evident in the published messages.
For example, in the ROS system shown in Figure 3.6, each ellipse represents
a node, rectangles show topics, and the directed edges tell the publish and subscribe relations. We can see that the topic /a/cmd subject ctrl state 0 is published by the node /a/car ctrl 1 which subscribes to the topics /a/car pose 1 ,
/a/subject ctrl state 1 and /a/subject pose 1 . We group the messages on these
four topics together at the program point of /a/cmd subjec ctrl state, because the
messages on the topic /a/cmd subject ctrl state are probably dependent on these
on the three input topics. Since dependencies may exist across more than one
publisher, we can further group topics along the chain. For instance, if we cluster messages across two publishers, the /a/cmd subjec ctrl state program point
will contain six topics, where the two extra topics are /a/subject status 2 and
/vicon/car 2 . Although the long-chain grouping may present interesting invariants, it also introduces increasing overhead as we will infer invariants on more
variables. And the relations between topics across more publishers are likely to be
weak.
The process of pairing messages for this is illustrated in Figure 3.7. The
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Figure 3.6: A ROS Program Example

top part presents a partial message trace, and the bottom part shows the data
trace of program points of publish/a/cmd subjec ctrl state. In each pairing, a
published message on topic /a/cmd subject ctrl state is paired with the latest
values of messages on several topics including /a/subject ctrl state, /a/car pose
and /a/subject pose. Note that not all messages are published at the same rate, so
each pairing includes the published message with the latest value available for all
the incoming messages. Our approach can be parameterized to relate published
values to a range of previously consumed values.
As shown in Figure 3.7, our approach attaches a time stamp to every program
point. Extracted from the bag file, the time stamp indicates when the message is
published, and it can be used to infer time-related invariants (Section 3.4.1).
For services, the translator retrieves the messages (request and response) on
the service calls from the service-recorded topic, and puts these messages into
corresponding service program points as shown in Figure 3.8. ROS parameters are
much like global variables which can be put into any program point if the user
chooses. For architectural messages, our approach reads and converts them into
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Figure 3.7: Sample trace (top) and message pairings (bottom)

the data trace at the architecture program points. Since Daikon does not support
user defined data structures, we represent the architecture data as string variables
as shown in Figure 3.8.
Our approach can also infer temporal invariants, which treats publishing
a message or calling a service as an event. Since all these events have been
recorded in bag files and they are ordered and stamped by time, the translator
only needs to retrieve the events indexed with their time stamps as shown in
Figure 3.9. In this example, the user chooses three events (/a/task waypose,
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Figure 3.8: Sample services and architecture trace (top) and their translations
(bottom)

26
/a/cmd subject ctrl state, /a/execute task) to infer temporal invariants, so the
translator extracts these three events from bags files and orders them by their time
stamps.
The translator conducts all the jobs under the instructions from the configuration file, where the scope tag declare the program points in terms of topics, services,
architectures and temporal properties. Figure 3.3 shows a sample configuration
file , where two topics are declared in the publish tags: /a/cmd subject ctrl state
and /a/task waypose. The attribute relative defines how the translator will group
messages to fill the program points of Daikon’s input. If relative is set with 1, the
translator will group the input and output topics with one publisher as previous
discussed, but it can be set to group messages across multiple publishers.
Monitoring services are defined in the call tag, as the service /a/execute task
is declared in the sample configuration in Figure 3.3. Monitoring architectures is
set in the arch tag, where the user can declare to analyze publishers, subscribers,
or services architecture individually by changing its contents. The temporal tag
declares a temporal analysis with an event scope defined in the events attribute.
For example, in Figure 3.3 the events attribute refers to three events by their labels:
a. publish to /a/cmd subject ctrl state, b. publish to /a/task waypose and c. call
service /a/execute task. The task of the translator is to retrieve these events from
the bag files and to put them into a temporal program point in Daikon as shown
in Figure 3.9. Since there is one temporal element in the configuration file, there is
only one temporal program point named temporal+element id. Each instance of
the program point contains one string variable consisting of the event and its time
stamp.
The overall translation procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. It first parses the
configuration file to initialize the msgTable and programPointTable. The msgTable
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Figure 3.9: Sample trace (top) and event sequence (bottom)

maps a topic name to a message instance, and the programPointTable maps a topic
name to its corresponding program point which is a list of message instances in the
msgTable. And then it iterates through all the messages in the bag. If the message
table contains the message’s topic, it updates the message value in the table. If
the message’s topic is a key in the programPointTable, it outputs the program
point instance into the output trace. ROS’s rosbag tool provides a C++ API, so we
implemented a C++ version of the translator, which reads the bag files and the
configuration file, and outputs the data trace files in Daikon’s format, including a
.decl file and one or more .dtrace file(s).
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Algorithm 1 Translation Procedure
1: parse con f ig
2: initialize msgTable
3: initialize programPointTable
4: while msg in bag do
5:
if msgTable contains msg.topic then
6:
update msgTable
7:
end if
8:
if programPointTable contains msg.topic then
9:
output programPointTable[msg.topic]
10:
end if
11: end while

3.4 Inferring Invariants
Techniques that infer invariants from program executions often target a set of
standard invariants such as the memory locations read or written at marked
program points [28] or the ranges of values observed for a variable at the entry or
exit points of a function [3]. Daikon provides default invariant templates including
unary, binary and ternary ones on scalar, string and array values. For arrays
of scalars, we implemented two additional invariant templates that capture the
ranges of the average and the standard deviation of the arrays, because it is useful
to characterize array variables representing, for example, sensors values by these
two properties. Moreover, identifying richer invariants, like the ones we aim to
capture in robotic systems, requires the specification of richer invariant templates.
Through this work we introduce four new types of invariant templates shown in
Table3.1 that reflect the spatial, time, architectural, and temporal nature of robotics
systems.
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Invariant
Time-related

Description
Messages’ frequency, variance and
change rate

Polygon

Relationships between two variables (2D range)
Node-communication graph

Architecture
Temporal

Temporal properties of events’ sequences

Example
f req(m1) > 21
var (m1.a) < 2.3
rate(m1.a) < 1.3
Sn
i ( ai x + bi y + c [>= | <=]0)
max pub(t1) = {n1, n2}
min sub(t1) = {n3}
interval time(e1, e2) < 0.1
interval max events(e1, e2) = {2 × e1}
((e1|e2)e3)∗

Table 3.1: New Invariants Templates

3.4.1

Time-Related Invariants

First, we introduce a new type invariant that incorporates time as a central
component. In robotic systems the program state is not just presented in variables’ values, but also in time-related variable values such as frequency, variance or change rate. The simplest of these templates serves to characterize
the messages’ frequency and variance. For frequency, this takes the form of
constantLower ≤ message f requency ≤ constantU pper. For our sample system
introduced in Section 5.1 and Figure 1.1, this type of invariant is useful to detect,
for example, stale location data that may direct the UAV to the wrong location
when the communication is broken.
The variance invariant takes a similar form as constantLower ≤ variable variance ≤
constantU pper. This type of invariant can also detect some stale data from a broken sensor. For example, usually the sensor gives data with some variance. If it is
broken and gives stale data, the variance invariant will detect that error.
A more complex type of invariant aims to capture the derivative of continuous
raw variables. For example, the derivatives of distance traveled over time may
render velocity or acceleration invariants. This type of invariant also takes the form
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of constantLower ≤ variable rate ≤ constantU pper. In our scenario, a common
instance of such invariant of this type is minVelocityU AV ≤ VelocityU AV ≤
maxVelocityU AV, which can detect wrong localization data as shown in our case
study in Section 5.1.
To infer these invariants, we take advantage of the time stamps attached with
the observation at the program points, and make three new invariant templates
in Daikon to associate the time component with variables at the same program
point. To filter out short-time noise (the interval of two messages is very small
which makes the change rate extremely large), the templates do the computation
in a time window instead of on every consecutive message pair. The updating
invariant procedures of the three new templates are shown in Algorithm 2, 3 and
4. The input of the algorithms is a trace file. Every time the algorithms are fed a
timestamped record with a variable and a value, they update the queues within
the time windows (the time difference between the first and the last elements in
the queue should be less than the window size), and then compute their derived
values (frequency, variance and change rate) that will serve to instantiate the
corresponding invariants. To compute frequency, Algorithm 2 only needs the time,
while to compute variance and change rate Algorithm 3 and 4 need the time and
the target variable. And Algorithm 3 works on all elements in the queue to get the
variable variance, while Algorithm 4 only computes the change rate based on the
first and the last elements in the queue. Note that Daikon takes care of associating
the time variable with other variables at the same program point and feeds them to
the invariant templates. The time window can also be tuned in the configuration
file.
Based on the algorithm, we can see the time complexity of Algorithm 2 and 4 is
O( N ), where N is the length of the data trace. The time complexity of Algorithm 3
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Algorithm 2 Frequency Invariant Inference (trace, window)
1: f req max ← 0.0
2: f req min ← Float.max value
3: queue ← newQueue()
4: while time in trace do
5:
queue.enqueue(time)
6:
while queue.last() − queue. f irst() > window do
7:
queue.dequeue()
8:
end while
queue.size()
9:
f req ←
window
10:
f req max ← max ( f req, f req max )
11:
f req min ← min( f req, f req min)
12: end while
13: output f req max and f req min as invariants

Algorithm 3 Variance Invariant Inference(trace, window)
1: var max ← 0.0
2: var min ← Float.max value
3: value queue ← newQueue()
4: time queue ← newQueue()
5: while value and time in trace do
6:
value queue.enqueue(value)
7:
time queue.enqueue(time)
8:
while time queue.last() − time queue. f irst() > window do
9:
time queue.dequeue()
10:
value queue.dequeue()
11:
end while
12:
variance ← Statistic.variance(value queue.toList())
13:
var max ← max (variance, var max )
14:
var min ← min(variance, var min)
15: end while
16: output var max and var min as invariants

32
Algorithm 4 Rate Invariant Inference(trace, window)
1: rate max ← Float.min value
2: rate min ← Float.max value
3: value queue ← newQueue()
4: time queue ← newQueue()
5: while value and time in trace do
6:
value queue.enqueue(value)
7:
time queue.enqueue(time)
8:
while time queue.last() − time queue. f irst() > window do
9:
time queue.dequeue()
10:
value queue.dequeue()
11:
end while
12:
if value queue.size() > 1 then
value queue.last() − value queue. f irst()
13:
rate ←
time queue.last() − time queue. f irst()
14:
rate max ← max (rate, rate max
15:
rate min ← min(rate, rate max )
16:
end if
17: end while
18: output rate max and rate min as invariants
is O( N ∗ q), where q is the queue size that depends on the window size. Usually,
we use a small window size, so q is much smaller than the length of data trace N,
so it is O( N ).

3.4.2

Polygon Invariants

We introduce invariant templates that define relationships between two variables1
that can be characterized through a convex polygon. This type of invariant is
valuable to capture physical space bounds. For example, if our operating scenario
was bounded by the dimensions of a room, this invariant template would be
instantiated and refined into a polygon similar to the shape of the room. This
1 We

note that we did explore invariant templates with more than two variables and although
some of the instantiated invariants were useful, we found that the cost of invariant generation was
exponential and hence prohibitive unless it was focused on a small set of topics.
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type of invariant can also characterize relationships between variables that are
hard to anticipate because of their lack of linearity. Take the UAV acceleration
and its pitch and roll for example. Ideally, these variables are linearly correlated.
However, wind velocity may introduce variation in these relationships that can
only be captured through the richer invariants like the ones we are proposing.
This invariant template takes the form of ∩in ( ai x + bi y + c[>= | <=]0) that
defines a polygon of n sides. Every time a new variable-value is read from a trace,
it is checked against the polygon. If it resides inside the polygon, it is ignored. If it
resides outside the polygon, the polygon is relaxed by computing the convex hull
that includes the new observation.
We implemented a new polygon invariant template in Daikon, where we use a
basic divide-and-conquer quickhull algorithm[17] as shown in Algorithm 5. The
input of quickhull algorithm is a set of points, which is provided by Daikon who
pairs two input variables and generates a set of values’ pairs as the point set. Then
the algorithm first computes a line between two extreme points in one direction
(X axis for example). Based on the side the point locates at, it separates the point
set into two sets (upper set and lower set, see Lines 1-2 in Algorithm 5), then
for each set it finds the one-side contours recursively (see Function f ind lines in
Algorithm 5), and finally it composes the polygon with the computed contours.
Its average case time complexity is O( N ∗ logN ). Ideally, for each pair of values,
we can first store them in a point set, and at the end we can run this algorithm
only once on the entire point set. However, we may run out of memory in this way,
because it needs to store a huge amount of values pairs from the data trace. So,
we chop the data trace into chunks and run the algorithm on them one by one as
show in Algorithm 6. Before adding point into chunk, it first checks if the point is
inside of the computed polygon. It only adds the point outside of the polygon into

34
the chunk to update the polygon. This does not affect the outcome of the process,
but it mitigates the memory consumption at the cost of performance. We carried
out a performance test in our first case study (Sec 5.1), where we only inferred
polygon invariants on the same data trace with different chunk sizes. The result in
Figure 3.10 shows that the performance degrades if we make the chunk size too
big. We empirically choose 20 as a fixed chunk size in our implementation.
Algorithm 5 quickhull(point set)
1: find point min x and point max x
2: divide point set into point upper set and point lower set
3: line ← ( point min x, point max x )
4: line upper list ← f ind lines(line, point upper set )
5: line ← ( point max x, point min x )
6: line lower list ← f ind lines(line, point lower set )
7: return line upper list + line lower list
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:

Function f ind lines(line, point set)
make empty line list
if (point set is empty)
add line into line list
else
find the point point with the maximum distance from line
line1 ← (line.p1, point)
pull points outside of the line from point set to point set1
line list 1 ← f ind lines(line1, point set1)
add all line list 1 into line list
line2 ← ( point, line.p2)
pull points outside of the line from point set to point set2
line list 2 ← f ind lines(line2, point set2)
add all line list 2 into line list
end if
return line list
EndFunction
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Algorithm 6 Polygon Invariant Inference(trace)
1: initialize polygon and point set
2: while v1 and v2 in trace do
3:
point ← newPoint(v1, v2)
4:
if polygon.not contains( point) then
5:
add point into point set
6:
end if
7:
if point set.size() ≥ chunk size then
8:
add all points in polygon into point set
9:
polygon ← quickhull ( point set)
10:
clear point set
11:
end if
12: end while
13: add all points in polygon into point set
14: polygon ← quickhull ( point set )
15: output polygon as polygon invariant
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Figure 3.10: Process Time vs. Chunk Size

3.4.3

Architecture Invariant

Distributed robotic systems have a dynamic architecture that can be tweaked
for different deployment conditions. These tweaks can often lead to erroneous
conditions, causing additional or missing topics or nodes.Take the ROS program
shown in Figure 3.11 for example. The correct architecture is shown with the solid
lines, where the node /a/car publishes to the topic /a/car pose and /a/U AV
publishes to /a/subject pose. Since the two nodes /a/car and /a/subject are
spawn from the same source code but with different remapped names, it is easy
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Figure 3.11: A ROS Program Example

for users to create mappings that cause incorrect connections as shown with the
two dashed lines in Figure 3.11. Although the messages’ values may look correct,
the system is in a dangerous state, because the computations are based on the
wrong messages, and the system may generate wrong control inputs and crash the
robot.
Our approach can capture architecture invariants for two kinds of resources:
topic and service, which are the two main mechanisms for nodes to communicate
in ROS. For each topic, we have a set of nodes as publishers and also a set of nodes
as subscribers as shown in Figure 3.11. For each service, we only have one server
at a time, but there might be multiple servers providing it at different times.
The architecture invariants take the form of the maximum and minimum nodes
set using some particular communication resources as

{resource : (max node set, min node set), ...}.
For example, Figure 3.11 shows the graph for nodes communicated through topics.
If the architecture does not change, this architecture is an invariant for the topics.
For the topic /a/subject pose topic, the invariant of publishers is /a/subject pose :
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({/a/uav}, {/a/uav}), which means there must be only one node named /a/uav
publishing to this topic. If the system is launched with incorrect mappings
as shown in dashed lines, the architecture invariant will be violated, because
/a/uav does not publish to topic /a/subject pose or /a/car publishes to this topic.
For subscribers of the topic /a/subject pose, the invariant is /a/subject pose :

({/a/car ctrl, /a/launch ctrl, /a/pid ctrl }, {/a/car ctrl, /a/launch ctrl, /a/pid ctrl }).
If /a/car ctrl is killed for some reason, the invariant will also be violated due to
the unexpected architecture.
We have developed a new invariant template in Daikon, which infers the maximum and minimum set of publishers, subscribers, and servers from architecture
variables in strings. As shown in Algorithm 7, given an architecture string, the
update procedure first parses the string to get the resource type (publishers, subscribers or servers), and then extracts the nodes into a node set. Next, it updates
the corresponding maximum and minimum sets. The time complexity is O( N ∗ k ),
where k is the size of the maximum node set. Since k is much smaller than N, the
time complexity is also N. An example of such architecture invariants outputted
by Daikon is shown in Figure 3.12, where the three architecture for publishers,
subscribers, and servers are specified respectively, and for each architecture the
maximum and minimum sets are presented as map variables.

3.4.4

Temporal Invariant

Another category of invariant is the temporal invariant, which expresses order
properties of events’ sequences. For example, in a multi-thread program, usually
to access a critical variable, the program needs to get the lock first and then release
the lock after finishing accessing the variable. The lock and unlock events should
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Algorithm 7 Architecture Invariant Inference(trace)
1: while arch in trace do
2:
parse arch into node set
3:
if not initialize max set then
4:
max set ← node set
5:
min set ← node set
6:
else
S
7:
max set ← max set node set
T
8:
min set ← min set node set
9:
end if
10: end while
11: output max set and min set as invariant

Figure 3.12: Architecture Invariants
always happen in the correct order lock → unlock. In our approach we focus on
two kinds of events: publish to a topic and call to a service, so the invariants will
define temporal orders or patterns between them. In our UAV system, we also
observed some temporal properties. For example, the pid ctrl node should not
publish control messages until it gets the iRobot and the UAV position messages.
And if the pid ctrl node does not receive position messages for a while, it should
stop publishing control messages.
We have two temporal invariant inference templates: ordered-pair interval
and pattern. The order-pair interval invariant captures a common pattern in
robotic systems, like a landing event is always followed by decreasing the thrust
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or a moving forward event should always follow a pitch command. And the
pattern invariant detects specific temporal pattern specified by the user that can be
represented by simple regular expressions.
3.4.4.1

Ordered-Paired Interval

The ordered-pair interval invariant captures the properties about the intervals
of ordered event pairs in event sequences. It expresses that an event is followed
by another event as shown in the pattern ( Ā∗ A B̄∗ B)+ , where A is followed by B.
It also specifies the interval information between the first event and the second
event. The interval information includes time and events, so the invariants capture
maximum/minimum interval time and maximum/minimum events happening in
the interval. The maximum/minimum events are multi-sets of events. However, if
the second event happens too far away from the first event in terms of the time
or the number of events, we would not consider it as an ordered-pair, because
we interpret it as a weak pair relationship. This invariant takes the form of

∩(e1 → e2 : {max time, min time, max events, min events}).
As an example shown in Figure 3.13, the first column is an event trace of three
events a,b,c and their time occurrence. We first analyze the ordered-pair interval
of a → b, where the inference engine first initializes four interval instances in the
second column, and then infers the interval invariants as shown at the bottom
of this column. The first two are the maximum and minimum interval, which
indicates that once a happens b should happen within 1 to 2 seconds. And the
maximum and minimum event sets in the interval are empty, which means b
should follow a without any other events (a or c) happening in the interval. So the
event sequence like acb or aab would violate these invariants. From the same trace,
it can infer the interval invariant of a → c as shown at the bottom of the third
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Figure 3.13: Event Trace and Interval Analysis
column. The maximum and minimum event sets are both {2 ∗ b} with means that,
every time we see a, we would expect exactly two b events happen before an event
c happens. If we see one b or three b or one a before c, the invariant is violated.
The fourth column is the interval analysis for b → c. The minimum event set is
empty and the maximum event set is {b}, which indicates that, if b happens, one
another b event may happen or nothing may happen before the event c happens.
If some event beyond the multiset happens, the invariant is violated. On the event
scope of a, b, c, three other intervals invariant (b → a, c → b and c → a) would be
generated also.
We implemented a new template for the ordered-pair interval invariant in
Daikon, as shown in Algorithm 8. Based on the event scope (see events attribute in
temporal tag in Figure 3.3) defined in the configuration file, it first initializes all
the ordered events pairs. Then, upon an event from the event trace, it updates all
the ordered-pair intervals (see Line 3-25 in Algorithm 8). If the interval time is
larger than a threshold (predefined to 2 seconds but configurable) or the size of
the event set is greater than a threshold (predefined to 10 events but configurable),
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it removes this interval (see Line 19-22 in Algorithm 8). Finally, it outputs all
the ordered-pair interval invariants that happens in the trace (see Line 27-31 in
Algorithm 8). The time complexity of this inference is O( N ∗ kr ∗ s), where k is the
number of events in the event scope, r is the number of symbols in the regular
expression, and s is the number of state in the DFA machine generated from the
regular expression.
3.4.4.2

User Defined Pattern

The second temporal invariant template targets a pattern defined by the user
in the form of a regular expression, which is declared in the pattern tag in the
configuration file. The invariants inferred will also be regular expressions as
S

regular exp(events). For instance, in Figure 3.3 the user declares a pattern ( AB)∗

with the events scope:
a. publish to /a/cmd subject ctrl state,
b. publish to /a/task waypose and
c. call service /a/execute task.
The inference engine will try to infer concrete patterns with these events. On the
event trace shown in Figure 3.9, the inference engine will find two invariants:

((/a/cmd subject ctrl state)(/a/execute task))∗ and
((/a/execute task)(/a/cmd subject ctrl state))∗ .
As a result, this invariant template is useful when the user has the domain expertise
to identify the kinds of patterns that may occur.
The pattern inference process works as shown in Algorithm 9. First, based
on a regular expression(such as ( AB)∗ ), it generates a DFA on the symbols (such
as A, B). Second, according to the event scope (such as /a/cmd subject ctrl state,
/a/task waypose and /a/execute task), it finds all the permutations of the events
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Algorithm 8 Ordered-Pair Interval Invariant Inference(trace)
1: initialize interval list on the event scope
2: while event in trace do
3:
for interval in interval list do
4:
if interval.isClose then
5:
if event is interval. f irst then
6:
interval.isClose ← f alse
7:
end if
8:
else
9:
if event is interval.second then
10:
if interval.time > time threshold then
11:
remove interval
12:
break
13:
end if
14:
update interval.max time and interval.min time
15:
update interval.max events and interval.min events
16:
interval.isClose ← true
17:
else
18:
add event into interval.current events
19:
if interval.time > time threshold or interval.current events.size >
events threshold then
20:
remove interval
21:
break
22:
end if
23:
end if
24:
end if
25:
end for
26: end while
27: for interval in interval list do
28:
if interval has been initialized then
29:
output interval
30:
end if
31: end for
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and then uses these permutations to generate all the DFA machines with transitions
on concrete events(such as ((/a/cmd subject ctrl state)(/a/execute task))∗ ). Since
the monitoring of the property can start at any point during the program execution,
each state machine has multiple current state pointers which are initialized pointing
to all its states. Third, on each event, the algorithm drives all the DFA machines
(each pointer goes to its next state on that event), and kills the machine if all the
pointers go into error states, since that indicates that there is no way for the regular
expression to hold. Finally, for each DFA machine, if there is one pointer that
has traversed all its states, it outputs this DFA machine in the form of a regular
expression on its concrete events.
Algorithm 9 Pattern Invariant Inference
1: parse pattern into a general DFA
2: from general DFA generate concrete DFA list on the event scope
3: while event do
4:
for DFA in DFA list do
5:
drive DFA on event if applicable
6:
remove DFA if all the pointers go into error
7:
end for
8: end while
9: for DFA in DFA list do
10:
if all the states in DFA has been traversed by its one pointer then
11:
output DFA
12:
end if
13: end for

We use multiple pointers as the DFA’s current state, because the recorded event
traces may not start from the very beginning of the executions, so the state machine
may not be at its starting state at the beginning of the event trace. As shown in
Figure 3.14, the rosbag tool may be launched later than the system, so the recorded
trace starts with “ABAAB” rather than “AABAAB”. As a result, we cannot find the
pattern (AAB)* with a normal DFA. So we initialize the DFA machine with a state
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Figure 3.14: State Set Transition of a Sample DFA

pointer set pointing to all its states, and at each input drive each state in the set
into its next state, and remove it if it goes into error state, as shown in Figure 3.14.
So that we can find the pattern from the partial event trace. In the last step, the
engine checks the traversed states of each pointer to verify the state machine, and
it only outputs the machines with good evidence.
The time complexity of the algorithm is O( N ∗ k2 ), where k is the number of
events in the event scope.
The regular operations we support includes Union or Or (as “|”), asterisk (as
“∗”), and Grouping or Parentheses (as “()” can be nested). The alphabet set is
limited to 26 alphabet letters (as a..z and A..Z) and Epsilon as (“ − ”).

3.5 Invariants Justification
At the end of the inference process, invariants that are statistically justified are
outputted. For the default invariant inference templates, Daikon provides the
mechanism for invariants justification, which computes a confidence level to filter
out invariants that are satisfied purely by chance. Each type of invariant has
its own rules for determining confidence, as defined in the computeCon f idence
method in the invariant template. The confidence computation is between 0 and
1, which relates to the number of samples that satisfy the invariant. For example,
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consider the Daikon’s default confidence computation is 1 − 1/2num samples . With 3
samples, the invariant’s confidence is 0.875, and the invariant will be suppressed
by the default confidence limit 0.99. If the confidence level for the invariant is
larger than the limit (7 samples), then Daikon outputs the invariant.
All new invariant templates apply the same statistical mechanism to compute
the confidence level. Each time a new data is analyzed, it checks its invariants.
If the invariant needs to be updated by the new data, the number of samples
goes back to 1; otherwise, it increases the sample size by 1. At the end, Daikon
computes the confidence level by 1 − 1/2num samples and decides whether to output
the invariant.
For our polygon invariant template, we use a different justification method
by comparing the polygon areas. The idea is that if two stochastic variables are
independent from each other, then, with enough samples, the polygon boundaries
will approximate a rectangle as shown in Figure 3.15. In that case, we can drop the
polygon invariant because it provides almost the same constraints as the boundary
invariants on the two individual variables. By dropping the invariant, we reduce
the overhead of checking the polygon invariant without sacrificing much precision.
In our approach, we measure the area ratio of the polygon over the rectangle to
decide whether to drop it as shown in Algorithm 10. The time complexity of the
algorithm is O(k), where k is the number of vertexes of the polygon. The threshold
of dropping can be set in the configuration file.
We performed an experiment using the data from the “normal” scenario of
our first case study (Section 5.1), which is a system designed to land a UAV on a
moving platform. We generated different sets of polygon invariants with different
dropping ratios, and used them to check 76 failed runs. If any invariant was
broken in the check, we investigate whether this set of invariants can detect the
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Figure 3.15: Polygon Justification
Algorithm 10 Polygon invariant compute confidence
1: compute area polygon
2: compute area rectangle
area polygon
3: ratio ←
area rectangle
4: if ratio > threshold then
5:
con f idence ← 0
6: else
7:
con f idence ← 1
8: end if
faults in the test cases. The result is shown in Table 3.2. We can see that, with
smaller dropping ratios, the number of polygon invariants and polygon sides
decreases without degrading the failure detection (at least for the faults in the
76 failed runs). The column violated polygons indicates that almost all polygon
invariants were ever violated in the 76 failed runs. The Failed Runs with Polygon
invariant violations is almost 100%, which could be resulted from that in the 76
failed runs almost all the failures could be detected by the range invariants, where
the polygon invariants (2-D range) put more restrictive constraints than the default
(1-D range) invariants.
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Dropping
Ratio
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Invariants

Polygons

Sides

755
702
644
568
429
329

466
413
355
279
140
40

6122
5107
4145
3078
1494
524

Violated
Polygons
465
413
355
279
140
40

(%) Failed Runs with
Polygon invariant violations
100(76/76)
100(76/76)
100(76/76)
98.7(75/76)
98.7(75/76)
97.4(74/76)

Table 3.2: Evaluation of Dropping Polygons

3.6 Conditional Invariants
We introduce the notion of conditional invariants, that is, invariants that can only
hold under certain conditions that can be identified as such. For example, in our
system the invariants that hold when the UAV is on the ground versus when it
is flying are quite different. This partition of the space of system behavior helps
to generate more and more precise invariants for subsets of the system states.
Attempting to produce invariants without differentiating such states would result
in a smaller set of more general invariants, but it would miss many valuable
invariants that only apply to one system state. For example, the critical invariants
that characterize how the system should behave when attempting to land on the
moving platform (e.g. the UAV and platform X and Y coordinates should be within
a certain threshold) would be dropped, as they would not hold when the UAV is
pursuing the landing platform.
To infer such invariants, we heuristically use the composition of existing invariants templates. First, we run Daikon on the whole data traces and identify
variables that have a small discrete set of values, which are variables with less
than 10 values (configurable parameter). This helps us identify variables such
as U AVmodes which has a range from 0 to 8 indicating whether the UAV is taking off, hovering, translating, landing, etc. Second, we partition the traces into
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Figure 3.16: Conditional Invariant Inference

sub-traces according to those discrete values. Third, we perform inference on the
sub-traces independently and incorporate the learned invariants and a predicate
on the discrete variable as part of the monitor. This heuristic approach identified
the state variable correctly in our case study one, but in some cases it may find
multiple such variables and divide the whole data trace into too many small sub
traces. Or if the state variable takes more than the specified values, this approach
would fail to find such variable. Given the importance of conditional variables, we
expect that in practice the software engineer will have to annotate such variables
or, as we have done in our studies, manually check them.
The workflow is shown in Figure 3.16, the ConditionAnalysis component parses
the invariants, and searches for variables with a small discrete set of values, which
is an invariant in Daikon in the form of “one of {...}”. Based on the searched
variables and its program point, it generates a new configuration file, which is
injected with the conditions and corresponding conditional program points. Then,
under the new configuration, the translator generates data traces separated by
conditions on conditional program points. And finally Daikon outputs conditional
invariants.
Inferring conditional invariants adds conditional program points, where each
program point has a sub trace of original traces. The size of the data traces to be
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processed is the same as before, so the cost should be equivalent except for the
additional analysis.
The user can also make the conditional analysis effective by declaring the
condition inferences in the configuration file by adding desired condition tags as
shown in Figure 3.3.

3.7 Invariant Inference Summary
In this chapter, we have described our invariant inference on ROS-base robotic
systems. The whole process has three steps: trace generation, trace translation and
invariant inference.
In the first trace generation step, we take advantage of rosbag tool to record all
messages on topics, and add a recording node to record ROS services, architectures
and parameters. This approach allows us to capture all necessary data by building
on the strengths of the existing ROS toolset.
In the trace translation step, the translator clusters topic messages according to
their publishing/subscribing relations, and utilizing the information in a configuration file, it puts topic, service and architecture messages into their corresponding
program points in Daikon’s format.
In the invariant inference step, we extend the invariant templates with four
new kinds of invariants: time-related, polygon, architecture, and temporal, which
capture some critical properties in robotic systems.
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Chapter 4
Monitor Synthesis
In this chapter, we will describe the monitor synthesis process in detail. The input
to this procedure is a set of invariants, and the output is a monitor node which
will be integrated into the system to check the inferred invariants automatically.
Since most of the invariants are simply boolean expressions, it is straightforward
to encode these invariants as predicates at the corresponding program points.
However, to enhance the effectiveness of the synthesized monitor we explored two
additional activities: invariant classification and recovery actions.

4.1 Monitor Synthesis Workflow
As shown in Figure 4.1, the workflow is separated into two steps: InvariantClassi f ication
and MonitorSynthesis. For invariant classification, we worked on refining the inferred invariant set. The inputs are an invariant set and extra system runs including
successful and failed ones. The output is a refined invariant set with the same
format as the input, so that this step can be injected or removed without affecting
the next step. The main idea of this step is evaluating invariants as binary classi-
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Figure 4.1: Monitor Synthesis Work Flow

fiers of system’s state. With the help of successful and failed runs in bag files, the
Checker first computes FalseNegative( FN ), TruePositive( TP), TrueNegative( TN )
and FalsePositive( FP) counts. Then, the Filter computes a F-score for each invariant, and based on a threshold defined in the configuration file it decides whether or
not to keep the invariant. For monitor synthesis, besides checking the invariants at
each program point, we inject actions to recover from detected invariant violations.
These recovery actions range from default actions like raising a warning to some
particular actions defined in the configuration file like blocking messages.
The two steps are set through the configuration file as shown in Figure 4.2
through the tags check and monitor. The tag check defines how to classify and filter
the inferred invariants, where the element success gives the directory containing
the additional successful runs while f ail provides the failed runs, and the attribute
threshold defines the threshold to filter out invariants. In the tag monitor, the
recovery actions are defined and assigned to the monitored program points in the
tag scope. The block tag specifies on which topics or services the message will be
blocked. The action tag declares an action in the term of publishing a particular
message to a topic, which are defined in the topic tag and value tag. The violation
tag specifies what actions to take at violations of invariants at specific program
points. More details and an example about these tags are provided in Section 4.3.2.

52

Figure 4.2: Monitor Part of a Configuration File

4.2 Invariant Classification
In this step, we aim to refine the inferred invariant set to be monitored by removing
invariants that are not useful at detecting anomalies according to our evaluation.
As shown in Figure 4.1, it consists of two components: Checker and Filter. Checker
checks the input invariants against the recorded successful runs and failed runs,
and outputs FN, TP, TN and FP for each invariant. The filter component computes the F-scores for all the invariants, and then prunes the invariants below the
threshold defined in the threshold attribute in Figure 4.2.
There are at least two benefits from this procedure. First, it reduces the monitor
overhead of checking , which may cause latency in relaying messages. For instance,
in the case study in Section 5.1, checking 1206 polygon invariants per message
has a 1.6 ms latency, while without invariant checking the latency is about 0.2 ms.
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Secondly, because of insufficient samples of system’s behaviors, some invariants
over constrained the system, and hence too fragile. For example, as we shall see in
Section 5.2, the polygon inference generates about n2 polygons on a program point
with n variables, and these polygons need lots of samples to make them stable.
These invariants may also obfuscate meaningful invariant violations among the
reported broken invariants.
To conduct the classification, we pick a small part (e.g. %10) from all successful
runs. Although these successful runs can be used to further refine invariants,
fragile invariants may still remain, and they will be easily violated with more runs.
Instead of refining these fragile invariants, we can prune them by checking them
on those successful runs. At the same time, we can also build confidence on the
invariants which are not violated. We also take advantage of failed runs which
may also happen in the training process. Failed runs can be used to measure the
effectiveness of the invariant to detect errors. If an invariant is always violated in
the presence of failures, it may characterize that kind of failure, and the monitor
may need to prioritize it.
Since we use violations of invariants to detect anomalies in the system, each
invariant is a binary classifier of system’s state. So, we are trying to measure the
performance of these classifiers or predictors. Intuitively, if an invariant is not
violated in any successful runs but it is violated in all failed runs, then it is an
ideal classifier with the highest performance to detect anomalies. On the other
hand, an invariant that is broken in both the successful and failed runs is a poor
classifier since it cannot distinguish among these different system states. In the
analysis above, an ideal invariant holds only in successful system states while it is
violated in abnormal system state. In practice, there will be probabilities instead
of certainties.
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As shown in Figure 4.1, using successful runs, we check each invariant to
compute the true negative and false positive rates, while we get the true positive
and false negative rates from failed runs. Equation 4.1 is used to compute the
true negative of an invariant, which is the fraction of the successful runs that the
invariant is not violated in all the successful runs. As shown in Equation 4.2 the
false positive rate of an invariant is the fraction of the successful runs that the
invariant is violated in all the successful runs. In the same way, we compute the
true positive and the false negative of the invariant as shown in Equations 4.3
and 4.4. However, we need a single value to score each invariant, so we compute
the precision and the recall, and label each invariant with the F-score. Precision
is positive predictive value (PPV) computed by Equation 4.5, which means if
the invariant is violated, how sure we can say the system is in dangerous state.
Recall (also known as sensitivity) computed by Equation 4.6 is that if the system is
actually in dangerous state how well the invariant indicates that. The F-score is a
single value to evaluate invariants, which is computed by the harmonic mean of
precision and recall (see Equation 4.7).

true negative =

not violated runs
success f ul runs

(4.1)

violated runs
success f ul runs

(4.2)

violated runs
f ailed runs

(4.3)

f alse positive =
true positive =
f alse negative =
precision =

not violated runs
f ailed runs

true positive
true positive + f alse positive

(4.4)
(4.5)
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recall =
Fβ = (1 + β2 ) ∗

β2

true positive
true positive + f alse negative

(4.6)

precision ∗ recall
, where β is a constant coe f f icient
∗ precision + recall

(4.7)

Consider the sample data in Table 4.1. Invariant1 is an ideal invariant, because
it has the highest precision, recall and F-score. Invariant2 is unlikely to happen in
reality since we infer the invariants from successful runs. Among Invariant3, 4
and 5, invariant5 is the best one, since it has the highest precision and recall;
Invariant4’s poor recall lowers its F-score; and invariant3 is the poorest one, given
its lowest precision and the fact that it can only detect a tenth of the failures.
For Invariant5, 6 and 7, invariant5 is the best one; Invariant4’s precision is lower
than Invariant5, which make its F-score lower than Invariant5; and Invariant7 is
poorest one among this three invariants for its lowest precision. We can adjust the
value of β to give different priority to precision and recall. As shown in Table 4.1,
β = 1.0 means giving equal weights to precision and recall, while a smaller β value
gives priority to precision and a larger one gives priority to recall.
Invariant

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Successes
%
%
true
false
negative positive
100
0
0
100
90
10
90
10
90
10
50
50
10
90

Failures
%
%
true
false
positive negative
100
0
0
100
10
90
50
50
90
10
90
10
90
10

F score
precision

1.0
0.0
0.5
0.833
0.9
0.643
0.5

recall

1.0
0.0
0.1
0.5
0.9
0.9
0.9

β0.5

β1.0

β2.0

1.0
0.0
0.278
0.735
0.9
0.682
0.549

1.0
0.0
0.167
0.625
0.9
0.75
0.643

1.0
0.0
0.119
0.543
0.9
0.833
0.776

Table 4.1: Evaluation Invariants as Binary Classifiers

Another point worth mentioning is that the Checker component can work
independently to do the comparisons between different data sets. For example,
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we can collect two data sets in different environments, and use one data set to
generate invariants, and then check them against the other data set, so that we
can find the broken invariants as the difference between the system behaviors
under the two environments. We will see this application of this component in
Section 5.2.

4.3 Monitor Synthesizer
The last step of our approach is the monitor synthesis. Given a set of generated
invariants on messages, architectures, and events, the synthesis process consists of
the creation of a node that monitors certain messages, other variables, or events
and checks whether they violate any of the invariants at particular program points.

4.3.1

Monitor

We have three sources that need to be monitored: messages on topics, messages
on services, and parameters and architecture. For messages on topics, the monitor
could simply subscribe to the desired topics, and every time it receives a message it
first computes some additional variables (e.g. message frequency, variable variance
and change rate), then it checks the corresponding set of invariants, and finally
reports if any of them are violated by the message. Since these invariants are
simply boolean expressions, such checks are quite straightforward. For messages
on a service, the monitor does the same thing, but the difference is that the monitor
has to intercept the service communication because of its particular mechanism in
ROS. For parameters, the monitor needs to query the ROS master every specified
interval, and does the same check as it does to other invariants.
The architecture invariants are expressed as the maximum and minimum set
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of nodes corresponding to the jobs such as publishing to a topic, subscribing to
a topic, and providing a service. The monitor will query the master node every
specified interval to get the architecture information, and then check if any nodes
are doing the jobs out of the maximum set boundaries, and if the jobs are being
done by the nodes as the minimum set defines. The check interval can be specified
through the configuration file as well.
For temporal invariants, we have two kinds of invariants on events publishing
to topics and calling services. The monitor has already captured these two kinds
of events in the state invariants monitor, so we only need to add the temporal
invariant checking when an event of interest happens. For each order-paired
interval invariant, the monitor keeps a special state machine with a timer and an
events recorder built-in. The special state machine works as shown in Algorithm 11:
when the first event of the state machine happens it will turn on a timer and an
event recorder; then it records the events other than the second event, and checks
the maximum event set; as the same time, if the time-up event happens, it reports
the error; and finally when the desired second event happens, it checks the
minimum event set and minimum interval time. The time complexity of each
check is O(k ), where k is the number of ordered-pair interval Invariants that the
event is involved.
For user defined pattern analysis invariants, the monitor first initializes the
state machines corresponding to the pattern invariants inferred, and then it runs
these state machines on each event, and reports the violation if any state machine
dies. These machines work as regular state machines, except they have a set of
current states inside. Each machine initializes its current states set as all its states.
On an event, it drives each state in the current state set to the next state, and
removes it when it goes into the error state. The machine dies when current state
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Algorithm 11 Check Oredered-Pair Interval Invariant (event)
1: for interval in interval invs do
2:
if interval.isClose then
3:
if event is interval. f irst then
4:
interval.isClose ← f alse
5:
turn on timer with interval.max time
6:
end if
7:
else
8:
if event is not interval.second then
9:
add event into interval.current events
10:
check interval.max events
11:
report errors if any
12:
else
13:
check interval.min time and interval.min events
14:
report errors if any
15:
clear interval.current events
16:
turn off timer
17:
interval.isClose ← true
18:
end if
19:
end if
20: end for
set become empty. The reason is that the monitor may start monitoring at any
state of the state machine of the pattern. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 12,
the time complexity of each check is O(m ∗ k), where m is the number of state
machines that the event is involved and k is the maximum number of states of the
machines.
Algorithm 12 Check Pattern Invariant (event)
1: for machine in state machines do
2:
for state in machine.current do
3:
state ← state[event]
4:
end for
5:
remove error states in machine.current
6:
if machine.current is empty then
7:
report violation
8:
end if
9: end for
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Figure 4.3: Monitor Node Skeleton

The monitor node consists of multiple threads as shown in Figure 4.3. The
main thread will query the master node to check the architecture invariant and
update the parameter table. When a message is published to a monitored topic, its
callback function updates the message table, checks the invariants at this program
point, and takes corresponding recovery action if an invariant is violated. When
a request is issued for a monitored service, its callback function first checks its
invariants on the request message. If an invariant is violated, it takes recovery
action and returns false to the client. Otherwise, it sends the request to the real
server, and waits for the response. Then, it checks the invariants on response
message, and if any one is violated, it takes recovery action and returns false to
the client. Otherwise, it returns the response to the client. The number of callback
function depends on the topics and services monitored. We implement a central
monitor to monitor all the invariants, but it can also be implemented into multiple
monitors for different topics or services to better scale up.
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4.3.2

Recovery Actions

The monitor also encodes what actions will be taken if any invariant is violated.
The recovery actions our approach supports are shown in Table 4.2. The default
action is raising a warning as mentioned in the previous section. Others include
blocking the bad message, publishing a message, calling a service and unregistering
unknown node. Some recovery actions need for the user to declare them in the
configuration file as shown in Figure 4.2.
Action
Raise a warning
Block Bad Message
Publish a Message
Call a Service
Unregister Unknown Publisher

Applied
Invariants
any
Topic and Service
any
any
Architecture

When
to call
Default
Users Declared
Users Declared
Users Declared
Default

Intercept
Communication
No
Yes
No
No
No

Table 4.2: Supported Recovery Actions

In the monitor tag of the configuration file, the block action defined in block tag
works for all state invariants on messages on topics and services, where the user
can define on which topics or services the monitor is going to drop the messages
if they violate any invariants. In Figure 4.2, the monitor will block the “bad”
messages on the topics /a/cmd subject ctrl state and /a/task waypose. Thus, for
those two topics, the messages are not just consumed by the monitor, but also
intercepted and only re-published if they do not violate any invariant. The monitor
can also block a service. If the request message breaks any invariants, the monitor
will not even send out the request to the real server, while if the response message
shows an violation, the monitor will only prevent the server from sending back the
response message to the client. This kind of actions can be useful in preventing
the system from getting into an abnormal state driven by the “bad” messages.
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The block actions need to intercept the communication between nodes. Our
approach supports it by remapping the names in the launch file of the ROS
system. As an example shown in Figure 4.4, the top part shows the original launch
file and the graph view of the program, where the two topics /a/task waypose
and /a/cmd subject ctrl state will be monitored. Our approach will first find the
nodes who subscribe to the monitored topics, which in this case are /a/pid ctrl
and /a/ctrl state machine. Then, our approach will localize the two nodes in
the launch file and add two name mappings which will make these two nodes
subscribe to two new topics /m/a/task waypose and /m/a/cmd subject ctrl state.
Finally, the monitor node is added in the launch file, and its graph view is
shown as the bottom right part of Figure 4.4, where /m/monitor is plugged
into the original communication channels (/a/task waypose to /a/pid ctrl and
/a/cmd subject ctrl state to /a/ctrl state machine), and it looks like a filter to
check and relay the messages. The monitor node raises a warning when an
invariant is violated by publishing the invariant to the topic /m/broken inv. Users
can also remove an invariant monitoring by publishing the invariant name to the
topic /m/clear inv at run-time.
The monitor can publish a particular message on some topic or call some
service with some arguments. These actions are defined in the action tag as shown
in the Figure 4.2. These actions can be applied to any kinds of invariant violations
by declaring them in the violate tag. For example, in Figure 4.2, the action labeled
with f will be taken when any invariant is broken on the program points labeled
as a, c, e.
For architecture invariants violation, the system can also prevent unknown
publishers. This means that when the monitor detects an unknown publisher (by
violating the maximum publishers invariant) registered on the ROS master node,
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Figure 4.4: Remapping names in ROS programs

it will unregister this publisher to keep the system isolated from this unknown
publisher. The intuition is that unknown publishers may have resulted from
incorrect remaps or “evil” nodes, which should be prevented immediately for
system protection. Subscribers on the other hand do not change the message
stream, so their effect on the system is likely smaller. So, the default actions do not
prevent unknown subscribers.

63

Chapter 5
Case Studies
In this chapter, three case studies are presented to assess our approach and explore
its potential.
In the first case study, we explore if the invariant monitor with associated
actions can reduce failure rate, and how effective are the new invariants at detecting
execution anomalies.
In the second case study, we explore another application of invariants, which is
the analysis of invariants of different deployments or execution environments.
In the third case study, we focused on investigating temporal invariants.
All the invariant inferring and monitoring tests were conducted on a Mac
Pro laptop, which had a 2.5GHz Intel Core i5 processor, a 4GB 1600MHz DDR3
memory and an OS X 10.9.1 operating system.

5.1 Case Study 1: UAV landing on Moving Platform
To start assessing our approach, we applied it on a system designed to land a UAV
on a moving platform. The target system was introduced in Figure 1.1 and has
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three main components: the UAV (Ascending Technologies Hummingbird [1]),
the moving platform (iRobot create [4] with a mounted landing platform of 50cm
x 50cm, following its standard “vacuum” motion pattern), and a control system
we wrote that tracks the iRobot and directs the UAV in its pursuit. For ease of
evaluation, we run the UAV and iRobot in a Vicon [13] motion capture room and
provide the UAV with the position of the iRobot.

5.1.1

Training and Evaluation

The training process was conducted under what we determined were normal
operating conditions. The UAV can takeoff from anywhere in a 8m x 8m room, the
iRobot wanders in the room, and the control system drives the UAV towards the
iRobot. The UAV attempts to land on the iRobot when its center is within 15cm of
the iRobot’s center for 1.5 seconds. These values were driven empirically under
normal operating conditions.
To generate invariants for the system, we collected bags from 83 successful
runs. We consider a run successful when the UAV lands on the iRobot, turns off
its motors, and remains on the platform for 5 seconds. On average, each run took
about half a minute.
Among all the messages in the collected bags, we chose those published on
four topics containing a total of 56 variables for invariant detection and monitoring.
Three topics contained position and attitude information: iRobot, U AV and task
(all doubles). The fourth topic had state information (e.g., startup, launch, hover,
task, land, shutdown.) of the controlling system: state (unsigned int). As explained
in Chapter 3, our tool processes the bag files, clusters the messages around nodes,
and packages the traces as required by Daikon. In the end, the trace file for
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invariant generation contains over nine million variable-value pairs.
Next, the processed data traces were fed to the extended Daikon inference
engine for analysis. Besides the default invariant templates, we activated two
of the new invariant templates: time-related and polygon at the time of the
assessment we had not implemented the other new invariant templates), and run
Daikon twice to get the condition invariants based on the value of state messages.
The inference process took 6 minutes 20 seconds to generate 1059 invariants
from these traces consisting of 465 default, 362 time-related, and 232 polygon
invariants. (This process is known to be polynomial with respect to the number
of variables [37] so identifying what nodes and topics to monitor, and techniques
for reducing the number of invariants to monitor is critical – we further discuss
this in Chapter 6). With these invariants and the actions defined in the monitor
configuration file, the tool generated the monitor node and a revised launch file
so that the monitor can could alongside the original system without the need for
recompilation. The recovery actions the monitor encoded are blocking the “bad”
messages and publishing a command message to bring the UAV to the task state.
We did not use the classification/filtering in this case study as that component was
developed after this study was conducted.
We evaluated the effectiveness of the invariant monitor on seven different
system scenarios (shown in Table 5.1). These scenarios were developed to test the
performance of the system with and without the monitor under normal conditions
(similar to the training set) and under stress. The stress testing scenarios contain
unexpected events that the system developer may not have anticipated, but that
the monitor may be able to detect. For the “s3 occupied landing” and the “s7 false
airport” scenarios we consider landing as a failure and a canceled landing as a
success, while for the other scenarios we set the same criteria for success as set for
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the training process.
ID
s1
s2
s3

Name
Normal
Wind Blowing
Occupied Landing

s4 Fragile Platform
s5 Slowed Link
s6 Stealing Vehicle
s7 False Airport

Description
Same as training conditions.
8 − 38 KPH wind.
Platform is occupied by another object.
Platform will tip if the UAV lands
near the edges.
iRobot position information given at
a slower rate.
Fake iRobot position is manipulated
to “steal” the vehicle.
iRobot position is incorrect and no
vehicle is located there.

Success Certiria
Succeeds on landing.
Succeeds on landing.
Succeeds if it avoids landing.
Succeeds on landing.
Succeeds on landing.
Succeeds on landing.
Succeeds if it avoids landing.

Table 5.1: Evaluation Scenarios.

5.1.2

Results

For each of the scenarios, we performed 5 trials with and without the invariant
monitor. Table 5.2 summarizes the results. Over all the test scenarios, the base
system without the monitor succeeded 23.8% of the time, while with the monitor
it succeeded 89.4% of the time. Figure 5.1 plots the success rates for each scenario.
The system with the monitor worked more safely that it did without the monitor,
as it succeeded with a higher rate for all the scenarios.
For the successes, the base system took an average of 35.5 seconds to succeed,
while the system with the monitor took 62.8 seconds to succeed. Figure 5.2 shows
a box plot depicting the average time in seconds with and without the monitor and
the variance in these measurements (only for the scenarios in which the system
without the monitor successfully landed). Without the monitor, the average time
has a low variance within each scenario and over all scenarios. With the monitor
there is a high variance in the time to success. This is because the monitor tends
to be conservative, as it only allows the UAV to land when all the invariants are
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Figure 5.1: Landing success rate

Figure 5.2: Time to land

satisfied. In the best case, this will happen on the first attempted landing, but in
most cases it requires a number of attempts. Also, to monitor the invariants the
monitor adds, on average, a 0.35ms latency to the published messages.

5.1.3

Detailed Analysis

We now look at the details for each of the scenarios. We first describe the “normal”,
“wind blowing”, and “fragile platform” in more detail since they let us introduce
different types of invariants and contexts, and then briefly discuss the other
scenarios. A summary of the results per scenario is available in Table 5.2.
In the “Normal” scenario, most failures were caused by the iRobot’s suddenly
changing direction while the UAV was trying to land. Figure 5.3 shows the
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Figure 5.3: Outcomes under normal scenario.

Figure 5.4: Normal scenario without monitor.

Figure 5.5: Normal scenario with monitor.
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Scenario

Without
Monitor
Successes
23.8%

With
Monitor
Successes
89.4%

%
Success
35

Avg. Time
to Land (sec)
35.5

S1

Normal

S2

Wind blowing

0

42.25

S3
S4

Occupied landing
Fragile platform

0
20

39

S5
S6

Slowed Link
Steal vehicle

20
20

42
41.6

S7

False airport
Scenario

S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7

Normal
Wind blowing
Occupied landing
Fragile platform
Slowed Link
Steal vehicle
False airport

0
%
Success
95
100
100
80
80
80
100

Avg. Time
to Land (sec)
62.8
141.8
145.6
106.4
147.6
-

Sample Invariants Broken
During Failure
polygon(U AV.x, iRobot.x )
polygon(U AV.y, iRobot.y)
polygon(U AV.x, iRobot.x )
polygon(U AV.y, iRobot.y)
polygon( I MU.roll, I MU.acc y)
polygon( I MU.nick, I MU.acc x )
U AV.z ≤ 0.371295
−0.0593147 ≤ U AV.rx ≤
0.145754
−0.106682 ≤ U AV.ry ≤
0.0836237
f req(iRobot) ≥ 2.04876
−0.457771 ≤ rate(iRobot.x ) ≤
1.01126
−0.532218 ≤ rate(iRobot.y) ≤
0.962376
U AV.z ≥ 0.245868
Reinitiated
Landings
1.7
4.8
16.2
6
-

Table 5.2: Summary of results across all scenarios.

successful and failed landings with and without the monitor in the test area where
the iRobot was operating. The thicker rectangle indicates the boundary of the
area. The iRobot will typically drastically change directions when it hits a wall,
although it occasionally chooses to follow the wall. That is why most of the crashes
without the monitor are located towards the borders. The single failure with the
monitor occurred as the UAV landed on the platform but slid off of it because of its
incoming speed (even though the speed was within the limits of training scenarios).
When the iRobot quickly changes direction, the monitor detects violations of one of
the inferred polygon invariants which characterize the relations between the U AV
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Figure 5.6: Wind Blowing Scenario

and iRobot positions, speeds, and rotations during the landing process. Figure 5.4
shows the y axis polygon invariant between the UAV and iRobot (U AV.y + 0.0554 ∗
iRobot.y ≥ −1.89 ∩ U AV.y − 0.990 ∗ iRobot.y ≤ 0.151 ∩ U AV.y − 1.081 ∗ iRobot.y ≥

−0.202 ∩ U AV.y + 1.732 ∗ iRobot.y ≥ −4.664 ∩ ...) without the monitor running.
When the UAV takes off, it is outside of this constraint. It then moves over the
iRobot and initiates the landing sequence. As seen in the figure, the UAV violates
the polygon invariant while still trying to land and crashes. In contrast, Figure 5.5
shows the same scenario with the monitor enabled. In this case, whenever the
invariants are violated, the landing is restarted. Eventually, the UAV is able to
successfully land while staying within these constraints.
In the “wind blowing” scenario (see Figure 5.6), the strong wind breaks many
invariants derived from the normal setup. Neither the system, nor the monitor
were designed to explicitly consider wind. However, the monitor is able to detect
violations of the UAV and iRobot positions and the roll and acceleration of the
vehicle, as described in Table 5.2. Figure 5.7 shows the locations where landings
occurred. None of the landings occurred within 2 meters of the blower where the
wind speed was up to of 33 KPH, which prevented the landing sequence. Even
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away from the fan, the system without the monitor was unable to successfully land.
The system with the monitor was able to detect constraint violations to prevent
the landing when it was unsafe and was able to land every time. Figures 5.8 and
Figure 5.9 show two of the trials with and without the monitor for the polygon
invariant involving the UAV pitch and acceleration on the x-axis. In Figure 5.8
the UAV leaves the polygon and crashes almost immediately. In Figure 5.9,
however, the violation of the invariant while using the monitor leads to a landing
reinitialization, avoiding a crash (other monitored invariants were violated within
the polygon leading to other landing reinitialization as well).
In the “fragile platform” scenario (see Figure 5.10), the landing platform would
tilt if the UAV did not land in the upper right quadrant as shown in Figure 5.10.
The monitor detected the error when checking the violation of the invariants
on iRobot.rx and iRobot.ry which indicate the horizontal angle of the platform.
Figure 5.12 shows one of the angles without the monitor. The straight lines
indicate the bounding constraint inferred. As shown by the line, the UAV started
to land on the platform, but then the platform tilted and the UAV fell off and
crashed. Figure 5.13 shows the same setup with the monitor. In this case, the
UAV initialized landings three times, but in the first two the landing was canceled
when the constraints were violated. Overall, with the monitor the UAV was able to
successfully land 80% of the time, while without the monitor it was only successful
20% of the time.
In the “occupied landing” scenario, the monitor detected that the platform was
occupied since it could not decrease its height to match that of the platform as it
did in the normal case. The invariant is shown in Table 5.2 as U AV.z ≤ 0.371295,
which means in normal case the height of the UAV should be lower than 0.371295
to finish its landing sequence. The monitor detected the violation on the invariant,
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Figure 5.7: Outcome under wind blowing scenario.

Figure 5.8: Wind blowing scenario without monitor.

Figure 5.9: Wind blowing scenario with monitor.
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Figure 5.10: UAV attempts to land on fragile platform.

and it canceled the landing, which we consider a success.
In the “slow link” scenario, the message rate from the iRobot position was
periodically (every 5 seconds) slowed down to 0.5Hz. to mimic a faulty positioning
sensor or a radio link that drops packets. The monitor detected this abnormal
situation by the invariant f req(iRobot) ≥ 2.04876 on message frequencies as shown
in Table 5.2. When the position of the iRobot was published at a low frequency,
the monitor interrupted the landing sequence to avoid crashes as it thought the
link was not reliable. And it only allowed the UAV to land at normal publishing
frequency.
In the “stealing vehicle” scenario, we published fake iRobot positions to try to
get the vehicle to land in another location when the iRobot was moving in the upper
half of the target area. The monitor detected this anomaly through a violation of
the invariant on the change rates of position messages. In Table 5.2, the invariant
are −0.457771 ≤ rate(iRobot.x ) ≤ 1.01126 and −0.532218 ≤ rate(iRobot.y) ≤
0.962376, which indicated the ranges of the iRobot’s speed. In this case, when the
positions of the iRobot changed too quickly, the UAV kept flying without landing
on either the false or the right platform. When the iRobot was moving in the lower
half of the cage and no other location was published, the UAV would try to land,
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Figure 5.11: Outcome under fragile platform scenario.

Figure 5.12: Fragile platform scenario without monitor.

Figure 5.13: Fragile platform scenario with monitor.
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which we considered a success.
In the “false airport” scenario there was no iRobot, but rather a false location
was published. If the false location was outside the region where the UAV had
previously seen the iRobot, then the UAV refused to go to that location and filtered
out these false messages. If the false location was in the correct range, the UAV
attempted to land. However, the monitor could tell the difference of the height
between the false and correct platforms, so the UAV with the monitor would not
land on the false airport.
In sum, in this case study we can see:
• The inferred invariants monitor increases the system success rate when faced
with unexpected situations although its efficiency may suffer;
• Although existing invariant templates serve to detect execution anomalies,
the two new invariant types (2-D polygon and time-related) contributed to
the detection of execution anomalies. In four out of the seven scenarios, the
anomalies can only be detected by the new invariants.

5.2 Case Study 2: Water Sampling
In this case study, we want to explore the usage of this tool on a system that we did
not implement and that is subjected to environmental changes. Since invariants
are known to be useful in analyzing a program’s evolution, we conjecture that, in
robotics, invariants may also be helpful in detecting problematic evolution of the
environment.
We conducted this analysis on the bag files collected from indoor and outdoor
flight tests of the Water Sampling system [30], which is designed to automatically
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Figure 5.14: Indoor Water Sampling Figure 5.15: Outdoor Water Sampling

Figure 5.16: Configuration for Water Sampling System

fly over a body of water, approach particular locations, and sample the water
through a pump, as shown in Figure 5.15. Since the pump powered by the UAV’s
battery can only work within about 1 meter height, the most challenging part of
this system is the height control. To avoid crashing into the water while collecting
samples, the height control needs to be precise, thus the system uses a combination
of ultrasonic sensor, GPS, and conductivity sensors to estimate the relative height.
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Figure 5.17: Water Sampling System

5.2.1

Training

The system flow is shown in Figure 5.17, which extends the UAV system used in
the first case study with some new components. A sampler board is added on the
UAV to control the water pump and report sensors’ data. The sensors include two
ultrasonic sensors and five conductivity sensors. The ultrasonic sensors indicate the
relative height of the UAV, and the conductivity sensors tell whether the pump is
actually in the water. These data are sent to the topic /a/water samler board raw in
the remote control system, where two components heightcompute and taskcontrol
are added. The heightcompute component first gets the height from ultrasonic
data, and combines the height from /a/robot imu to compute the more precise
relative height, and then updates the /a/subject pose message. Based on the UAV
status, pump status and other information, the taskcontrol component controls the
task flow including how to fly the UAV and when to turn on/off the pump.
The system was first tested in a controlled environment, as shown in Figure 5.14,
where the UAV flew over and sampled water from a fish tank protected by a
ultrasonic absorbing foam. We collected bags from 16 successful indoor runs,
when the UAV started 2-3 meters away from the fish tank, flew over the tank,
then descended and sampled water three times, and finally flew back and landed.
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Having talked to the developer, we chose three critical topics to monitor, which
are /a/water sampler board raw, /a/robot imu and /a/subject pose as shown in
Figure 5.16. Those topics capture new or important information about the system
including the simpler board data and the UAV attitude data. We also focused
on the messages when the system was in the water sampling state (when the
pump control was 1). We instantiated the default invariant templates, and our new
time-related, polygon, architecture and temporal invariant templates. We generated
a 49.2MB data trace with 44 variables, and inferred 711 invariants including 242
ones from Daikon’s default templates, 77 time-related, 385 polygon, 4 architecture
and 3 temporal ones from our extended invariant templates in 17 seconds.
We first evaluated if the bags were sufficient to represent the program behaviors
in the indoor environment by checking the inferred invariant set’s stability. We
conducted it by picking one bag out of the training set, and using this bag to check
the invariants generated from the remaining 15 bags. If the invariants were not
violated by the checking bag, we considered the invariants stable. We randomly
picked 3 bags as the checking bags (one at a time) to do the check, and the result
is shown in Table 5.3.
We observed that the default, time-related, architecture and temporal invariants
were stable, but 35% of the polygon invariants were violated in the third check.
The reason is that the polygon invariants are built from combinations of variables
at one program point, no matter whether they are dependent or not. For example,
our approach will infer a polygon invariant combining the UAV’s speed and the
UAV’s heading angle. They are independent variables, but with a limited set of
runs, the data may not show the maximum and minimum speed when the UAV
is heading in different directions. So this type of invariants needs more runs to
support it. Therefore, we used the 13 indoor runs to generate the invariants, and
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then use the other 3 indoor runs to classify and filter out fragile invariants. Finally,
we got 533 invariants, which includes 229 default, 64 time-related, 4 architecture, 3
temporal and 233 polygon invariants.
Stability
check
1
2
3
retained

Default
invs/violated
242/2
242/2
242/6
229

Time-related
invs/violated
77/4
77/0
77/3
64

Polygon
invs/violated
385/69
385/24
385/135
233

Architecture
invs/violated
4/0
4/0
4/0
4

Temporal
invs/violated
3/0
3/0
3/0
3

Table 5.3: Stability Check Result

5.2.2

Evaluation

We collected a bag from one outdoor run, which successful flow about 30 meters
over the lake of 1.091(km)2 and sampled water from it. We first checked the default,
time-related and architecture invariants invariants inferred indoors against this
outdoor bag, where we found that 24 invariants were broken, while there are 276
unbroken invariants shared by the indoor and outdoor environments. The broken
invariants indicate environmental changes from indoor to outdoor projecting to
the UAV’s behaviors, as shown in Table 5.4.
The frequency invariant tells the change of navigation signals frequencies,
where the frequency of outdoor GPS is slower than the VICON system we used
indoor. The broken invariants about pitch and roll indicate the difference of the
UAV’s attitude, which could be caused by the winds outdoor. The violation of
the invariants about the acceleration is also a direct result of the more windy
environment outdoor or more aggressive maneuvers. The architecture invariants
are broken because the system switches from the indoor VICON system to the
outdoor GPS navigation, which used different nodes. The one violated ordered-
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pair temporal invariant was caused by the low-frequency GPS signal which made
the interval greater than 0.0621s.
Invariant Checked

Invariant Violated

300

24

Details
sampler raw.H2O1 >= 306
Var (sampler raw.H2O5 ) <= 14.0
pose.rotation.x <= 0.0535418
pose.rotation.y >= −0.0804302
pose.translation.x >= −1.99948
pose.translation.y < pose.translation.z
pose.translation.y <= 0.32948
Freq( pose) >= 20.0
imu.acc angle nick >= −4284
imu.acc angle roll < imu.mag z
imu.acc angle roll <= 2516
imu.acc x calib >= −747
imu.acc y calib >= −439
imu.angle nick >= −5099
imu.angle roll <= 3192
imu.angvel nick < imu.mag z
imu.angvel nick <= 2173
imu.height re f erence! = 0
imu.mag x <= 772
Var (imu.angle yaw) >= 5934.0
MaxPubs( pose) = [vicon]
MinPubs( pose) = [vicon]
MaxSubs( gps) = []
imu → pose : {0.0000524, 0.0621, φ, 2 ×
raw + 2 × imu}

Table 5.4: Check Result of Outdoor Testcase

From the broken invariants, we can learn how to improve the indoor testing of
the system to better mimic the outdoor environment. For example, we could tune
the indoor navigation signal frequency to match the outdoor one, or use a fan to
simulate the windy environment. These enriched indoor tests could reduce the
risk when deploying the UAV outdoor.
For polygon invariants, the result showed that 174 out of 233 invariants were
violated as well. All the polygon invariants related to the variables associated with
the violated invariants in Table 5.4 were also violated. For example, the polygon of
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imu.acc angle nick and imu.mag y were violated, though the two variables were
not quite related to each other. Given the number of violations, we conjecture that
polygon invariants need further pruning to be useful.

5.2.3

Checking User Assumption

Through our interactions with the developer of the system in the training process,
we were able to find some unstated and wrong assumptions. For example, the
developer assumed there should be an invariant indicating that, when the pump is
on, the sensor should always be wet as shown in conditional invariant pump on =
1 ⇒ sampler raw.wet >= 670. However, our inference system did not find such
invariant so we proceeded to investigate why. To pinpoint the potential bad data,
we set the invariant list with this supposedly missing invariant, and then used the
generated checker to check all the bags. The checker found the data that violated
this invariant. We provided this finding to the developer, and ended up finding
the problematic code in the on-board pump controller that caused the absence of
this invariant. We found that, if the sensor was not wet in the sampling state, the
pump controller would still try to turn on the pump every 0.4 seconds, and fail
immediately. However, it would set the pump state to be 1(on) in the message,
even if it failed to turn on the pump. That is why we found many such pulses on
the pump state when the sensor was not wet. In addition, while we were looking
into the data, we found another strange behavior with pulses of the pump state
when the sensor indicated wet. The pattern looked very similar when the sensor
was not wet. The developer confirmed the problem. While a node published the
message indicating that the sensor was wet, the on-board controller felt the sensor
was not wet, because they were using different thresholds to determine wet or dry.
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In sum, this case study shows two other applications of our tool:
• It can be used to check user expectations and assumptions, and pinpoint the
context of the inconsistencies if there is any violation.
• It can be used to check differences of system behaviors under different
environments or deployments.

5.3 Case Study 3: Crop Surveying
In the third case study, we worked with a system that utilized a UAV and a small
laser scanner to measure crop heights as shown in Figure 5.18. It processes the
cluttered laser reflection data in real-time to determine both the distance to the
ground and to the top of the crops to allow users to precisely control the height of
the UAV. From the view of the UAV’s control, it provided more precise relative
height data from a laser sanner when flying over the crop. And it applied a Kalmen
filter to filter out some clutters in the raw scanner data. Intuitively, the integration
of the new height computation component needs to be the focus of testing, since
we need to know how well it integrates with original system. In this case study,
we also explore the application of temporal invariants.

5.3.1

Training

This system is still based on the structure of the UAV control system we used in
the previous case studies, but it remaps topics and adds three nodes as shown
in Figure 5.19, where each ellipse represents a node and each rectangle a topic.
The scan node generates the laser scan messages, and the imu laser sync node
synchronizes and pairs the scan messages and imu messages. The kalman height
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Figure 5.18: Crop Surveying

Figure 5.19: New Components

node computes the height based on pairs of scan and imu messages. Thus, these
nodes and topics compose a subsystem (as shown in the dashed rectangle in
Figure 5.19), which computes the more precise height and updates the field in the
original messages.
From the structure of the system, it makes sense to monitor the six related topics.
The subsystem has some synchronized behaviors, as the node imu laser sync has to
consume two messages from the two topics scan and obs imu individually, and then
generates a new message on the topic scan sync. We inferred temporal invariants
and architecture invariants as shown in the configuration file 5.20. The developer
provided 13 bags from his tests, which were conducted at the lab when the UAV
flew over fake crop as illustrated in Figure 5.21 successfully. Because the system
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Figure 5.20: Configuration for Crop Surveying System

Figure 5.21: Fake Crops

was still under development, we only used those bags for invariant inference
without classification, filtering and monitoring. The process generated a 116.3MB
data trace, and inferred 783 invariants including 293 default, 133 time-related, 350
polygon, 4 architecture and 3 temporal in 46 seconds.
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5.3.2

Evaluation

We found an interesting invariant, an instance of an extension we performed on
an array variable ranges: 0.12984 <= std(scan.ranges) <= 1.4126. This variable is
from scan message, which contains an array representing the ranges detected by
the laser scanner on different directions. The invariant captures that the standard
deviation of the ranges in one scan should be greater than or equal to 0.12984.
This makes sense because when the UAV is flying over the crop, the laser scanner
should always give varied values in one scan. If the ranges all have the same
values, there is probably something wrong with the scanner. For example, if the
scanner is blocked by an object or all the objects are out of the scanner’s maximum
range, we will get the same values. So this invariant can detect that error and
report it users. On the other hand, we can imagine that when the UAV is going
to land on a level ground, the standard deviation of the ranges should be small.
We could get an invariant in the landing state like std(scan.ranges) <= 0.3. If we
are trying to land on a uneven ground or crops, this invariant will be violated and
raise warnings.
We were also interested in temporal invariants, because we knew there was
a synchronization node scan sync, which paired the closest two messages on the
topics of scan and obs imu into a new message on the topic scan sync. The paired
messages should be close enough to make the kalman height node generate a
precise enough estimate. The inferred ordered-pair interval invariants indicated
this property as shown in Table 5.5. The first column shows the interval between
the scan messages and the obs imu messages, which were highly interleaved. The
maximum interval between these two messages was 1.139s. If the two messages
arrive with quite different time stamps, the scan sync node may still pair them and
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put it to the kalman height node which may generate the wrong height estimate.
However, the monitor would detect that abnormal behavior and prevent the error’s
propagation.
We also tried to infer the pattern invariants (( A| B)+ C )∗ on the events of
publishing to topics scan, obs imu and scan sync as shown in the configuration
file in Figure 5.20. We expected there would be ((scan|obs imu)+ scan sync)∗ and

((obs imu|scan)+ scan sync)∗ , because the node imu laser sync had to receive the
at least one message to publish the new synchronized message. But there was
no such pattern in the bag’s event sequence. We see in Table 5.5 that there are
consecutive scan sync messages, which break this pattern. The precise pattern
may not show up in the event sequence because of the unsynchronized message
subscription mechanism of ROS system, which means messages publishing order
may change in messages receiving order. In this case, there might be the case
that the imu laser sync node first receives and processes a scan message and then
publishes a scan sync message, but the recording node may received the scan sync
message before the scan message. So the patterns ((scan|obs imu)+ scan sync)∗ or

((obs imu|scan)+ scan sync)∗ are not appropriate.
As we discussed it with the developer, we realized that this pattern did exist in
the view of the node imu laser sync. However, because of the high frequency of
the messages ( 10Hz) and the unsynchronized message subscription mechanism of
ROS, the recording node received a different sequence of messages, which violated
the pattern.
The last thing we want to discuss are the architecture invariants. As we can
see in Figure 5.19, the laser scanner subsystem sits between the robot prot node
and the robot imu and robot gps topics. If anything happens in the subsystem that
breaks the connection, the obs gps and obs imu messages cannot pass through,
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Interval
Min Interval(s)
Max Interval(s)
Min Events
Max Events

scan → obs imu
0.103
0.995
φ
5 ∗ scan
4 ∗ scan sync

obs imu → scan
0.10
1.139
φ
4 ∗ obs imu
4 ∗ scan sync

scan sync → scan
0.10
1.31
φ
3 ∗ obs imu
3 ∗ scan sync

Table 5.5: Interval Invariants
which may cause the UAV’s crash. For example, the messages would be blocked, if
the node kalmen height dies. By monitoring the architecture invariants, this failure
can be detected by the violations of the minimum publishers and subscribers
invariants as shown at rows 3, 4, 5, 6 in Table 5.6. The recovery action defined in
the configuration file 5.20 can be taken, where the monitor will relay the messages
to provide the position and attitude information continuously.
ID
1
2
3
4
5

Topic
scan
obs imu
obs gps
scan sync
robot gps

max pubs
scan
robot prot
robot prot
imu laser sync
kalmen height

min pubs
scan
robot prot
robot prot
imu laser sync
kalmen height

6

robot imu

kalmen height

kalmen height

max subs
imu laser sync
imu laser sync
kalmen height
kalmen height
robot trans,
robot monitor
robot trans

min subs
imu laser sync
imu laser sync
kalmen height
kalmen height
robot trans,
robot monitor
robot trans

Table 5.6: Architecture Invariants

In this case study we found that:
• The interval invariant can constrain the system’s temporal behaviors at some
level, but because of the unsynchronized message passing system, precise
temporal patterns may be hard to detect;
• The architecture invariants can be quite effective, and may be very useful
to pair the architecture reconstructing actions, like repairing the broken
channels by relaying messages.
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5.4 Limitations
The case studies illustrated the potential of the approach, but it also put in evidence
its current limitations. One kind of limitation is when abnormal behavior cannot
be detected by the invariants. A second kind of limitation is when the invariant is
violated but it does not lead to a failure.
One reason of the first kind of limitation is the invariant’s approximation of the
system’s correct behaviors. For example, with a value trace of variable v such as

{1, 5, 2, 4, 2, 5}, we infer an invariant 1 ≤ v ≤ 5. This invariant puts a constraint on
the variable in terms of the range according to the data trace, but it also relaxes the
constraint from the data trace, since it allows the variable to be 3, which did not
happen in the data trace. The same thing happens with polygon invariants, which
can detect a 2-D space boundary by a convex hull; however, it cannot capture
the space boundary of an non-convex hull. Also, the polygon invariant cannot
detect a dangerous hole in the space which may crash the UAV either. This kind
of limitation is rooted from the fact that the inferred invariants are approximations
of system’s correct behaviors. Actually, we cannot expect an analysis tool without
such limitation, otherwise this analysis tool is an even better implementation than
the original system. As long as an analysis technique can detect some kind of bugs
with reasonable trade-off compared to the gain, the technique has the potential to
be valuable.
Another reason for the first kind of limitation is the model approximation, as
our approach only uses some signals (messages, architectures and parameters) to
represent the whole system state, which are not enough to detect all the anomalies.
For example, the anomalies laid in the variables other than messages cannot
be detected by our approach. Some relations among two messages may exist,
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but our approach does not consider them because of their long distance on the
publish/subscribe chain. In fact, all analysis techniques have to make decisions
on the model approximation. Our approach sets the granularity on the message
level based on the scale of the robotic system, and in the experiments we can get
reasonable gains with this granularity.
Our approach also generates some false positives, when some invariants are
violated but they do not lead to a failure. Here, most false positives are caused by
insufficient training runs which are used to generate the invariants. Although we
provide some justification and classification methods to reduce their effects, they
cannot eliminate all false positives. And different types of invariants may need
different numbers of training runs to make them stable. As shown in the second
case study, polygon invariants need more training runs than 1D-range invariants.
In addition, some false positive invariants in one scenario may be useful to detect
anomalies in other scenarios. For example, we may use one kind of platform
to training the UAV-landing system. Some invariants inferred indicate that the
system is angle-sensitive, which are useful to detect some anomalies. However,
when we change it to another kind of platform which makes the system not that
angle-sensitive, these invariants become the false positives. For those reasons, we
made the invariant monitor adjustable at runtime, where users can remove any
invariants as they want.
Apart from the overhead in the invariant inference, the monitor also brings in
run-time overhead in terms of message-relaying latency. We measured it in the first
case study, where to monitor the 1059 invariant the monitor introduced a 0.35ms
on average latency in relaying each message. This is an acceptable overhead in our
case, but it may become unacceptable when dealing with real-time or larger scale
systems. Although we have not tried, having distributed monitors may alleviate
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the run-time overhead.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Conclusion
We have introduced a general approach for automated invariant inference and
monitoring, and implemented it in the context of ROS so that any system implemented with this operating system can leverage it with minimal effort. The
approach is able to automatically infer rich invariants for a robotic system based
on a training set, and it was able to detect the violation of those invariants and
avoid failures under various scenarios. The case studies illustrated the potential of
the technique and toolset in error detection and potential recovery when facing
unexpected situations.
The approach includes new invariant templates that account for properties
that are deemed important in the context of robotic systems, such as time-related,
polygon, architecture, and temporal invariants. Invariant classification was also
built in the approach, which can help to refine the invariant set to reduce the
number of false positives. In the invariant monitor, recovery actions can be defined
to be triggered when anomalies are detected.
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6.2 Future Work
Besides more extensive empirical assessment of the approach we see several
technical avenues for future work.
First, we would like to study how to increase the scalability of the approach.
For invariant generation, we are investigating the application of filters based on
the variance and pedigree of a variable as well as the automatic identification of
redundant messages. Within invariants monitoring, we are investigating sampling
schemes that can reduce the monitoring cost while minimizing information loss.
Most of them are based on expert knowledge about the target system, consequently
the tool-set will help users obtain it.
Second, the approach generality and power could be increased by moving from
invariants consisting of boolean expressions to probabilistic expressions, and by
incorporating more temporal operators, which may help to capture the uncertainty
present in robotic systems. It may also be worths it to integrate static analysis to
guide the engine to generate more meaningful nontrivial invariants.
Last, the type of actions we support when an invariant is violated could be
enriched to support, for example, message rectification so that minimally reformulated messages can be published but still remain within the system invariants.
Another potential direction is learning recovery actions from users interventions.
When the system misbehaves, which could help to incorporate fault tolerance into
the system design.

93

Bibliography
[1] Ascending technologies hummingbird.

http://www.asctec.de/uav-

applications/research/products/asctec-hummingbird/. 5.1
[2] Claraty robotic software. https://claraty.jpl.nasa.gov. 1.1
[3] The daikon invariant detector. http://groups.csail.mit.edu/pag/daikon/. 3.1,
3.4

[4] irobot create programmable robot. http://www.irobot.com/us/learn/Educators/Create.asp
5.1
[5] Lightweight

communications

and

marshalling.

https://code.google.com/p/lcm/. 1.1
[6] Microsoft robotics. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/robotics/. 1.1
[7] Nimbus lab. http://nimbus.unl.edu/projects/.
[8] Open robot control software. http://www.orocos.org/.
[9] Opencv. http://opencv.willowgarage.com/.
[10] Openrave. http://openrave.org/.
[11] Pr2 robot. http://www.ros.org/wiki/Robots/PR2.

94
[12] Ros. http://www.ros.org. 1, 1.1, 2.1
[13] vicon motion capture system. http://www.vicon.com. 5.1
[14] Toby H. J. Collett and Bruce A. Macdonald. Player 2.0: Toward a practical
robot programming framework. In in Proc. of the Australasian Conference on
Robotics and Automation (ACRA, 2005.
[15] Christoph Csallner, Nikolai Tillmann, and Yannis Smaragdakis. Dysy: dynamic symbolic execution for invariant inference. In ICSE, pages 281–290,
2008. 2, 2.2
[16] Mauro Pezz Davide Lorenzoli, Leonardo Mariani. Automatic generation of
software behavioral models. In ICSE ’08 Proceedings of the 30th international
conference on Software engineering, pages 501–510, 2008. 2, 2.2
[17] William F. Eddy. A new convex hull algorithm for planar sets. In ACM
Transactions on Mathematical Software (TOMS), pages 398–403, 1977. 3.4.2
[18] Michael D. Ernst, Jake Cockrell, William G. Griswold, and David Notkin. Dynamically discovering likely program invariants to support program evolution.
In ICSE, pages 213–224, 1999. 1, 1.1, 2, 2.2
[19] Michael D. Ernst, Jeff H. Perkins, Philip J. Guo, Stephen Mccamant, Carlos
Pacheco, Matthew S. Tschantz, and Chen Xiao. The daikon system for dynamic
detection of likely invariants. In Science of Computer Programming, pages 35–45,
2006. 1.1, 2, 2.2
[20] Mark Gabel and Zhendong Su. Javert: fully automatic mining of general
temporal properties from dynamic traces. In FSE, pages 339–349, 2008. 1.1, 2,
2.2

95
[21] Mark Gabel and Zhendong Su. Online inference and enforcement of temporal
properties. In Proceedings of the 32nd ACM/IEEE International Conference on
Software Engineering - Volume 1, ICSE ’10, pages 15–254, New York, NY, USA,
2010. ACM. 2.2
[22] Franz Wotawa Gerald Steinbauer, Martin Morth. Real-time diagnosis and
repair of faults of robot control software. In RoboCup, pages 13–23, 2005. 2, 2.3
[23] Jeremy H. Gillula and Claire J. Tomlin. Guaranteed safe online learning via
reachability: tracking a ground target using a quadrotor. In Robotics and
Automation (ICRA), 2012 IEEE International Conference, 2012. 2, 2.3
[24] Jeremy H. Gillula and Claire J. Tomlin. Reducing conservativeness in safety
guarantees by learning disturbances online: Iterated guaranteed safe online
learning. In RSS, 2012. 2, 2.3
[25] Raphael Golombek, S. Wrede, M. Hanheide, and Martin Heckmann. Learning
a probabilistic self-awareness model for robotic systems. In IROS, pages 2745
– 2750, 2010. 2, 2.3
[26] Raphael Golombek, S. Wrede, M. Hanheide, and Martin Heckmann. Online
data-driven fault detection for robotic systems. In IROS, pages 3011–3016,
2011. 2, 2.3
[27] UK TEX User Group. TEX Frequently Asked Questions. Available at: http:
//www.tex.ac.uk/cgi-bin/texfaq2html.
[28] Sudheendra Hangal and Monica S. Lam. Tracking down software bugs using
automatic anomaly detection. In ICSE, pages 291–301, 2002. 1.1, 2, 2.2, 3.4

96
[29] Stephen G. Hartke. A survey of free math fonts for TEX and LATEX. The
PracTEX Journal, 1, 2006.

Available at: http://www.tug.org/pracjourn/

2006-1/hartke/.
[30] A. Burgin B. Zhao John-Paul. Ore, S. Elbaum and C. Detweiler. Autonomous
aerial water sampling. In The 9th Intl. Conf. on Field and Service Robotics (FSR),
2013. 5.2
[31] Janet L. Wiener Patrick Reynolds Athicha Muthitacharoen Marcos K. Aguilera,
Jeffrey C. Mogul. Performance debugging for distributed systems of black
boxes. In SOSP ’03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating
systems principles, pages 74–89, 2003. 2.4
[32] Emre Kcman Jim Lloyd Dave Patterson Armando Fox Eric Brewer Mike
Y. Chen, Anthony Accardi. Path-based failure and evolution management. In
Proceeding NSDI’04 Proceedings of the 1st conference on Symposium on Networked
Systems Design and Implementation, pages 309–322, 2004. 2.4
[33] Frank Mittelbach, Michel Goossens, Johannes Braams, David Carlisle, Chris
Rowley, Christine Detig, and Joachim Schrod. The LATEX Companion. Tools and
Techniques for Computer Typesetting. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, USA,
second edition, 2004.
[34] Sumant Kowshik Parth Sagdeo, Viraj Athavale and Shobha Vasudevan. Precis:
Inferring invariants using program path guided clustering. In Automated
Software Engineering (ASE), 2011 26th IEEE/ACM International Conference, ASE
’11, pages 532–535, 2011. 2, 2.2
[35] Janet L. Wiener Jeffrey C. Mogul Mehul A. Shah Patrick Reynolds, Charles Killian and Amin Vahdat. Pip: Detecting the unexpected in distributed systems.

97
In NSDI’06 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Networked Systems Design and
Implementation, pages 115–128, 2006. 2, 2.4
[36] Rebecca Isaacs Paul Barham, Austin Donnelly and Richard Mortier. Using
magpie for request extraction and workload modelling. In OSDI’04 Proceedings of the 6th conference on Symposium on Opearting Systems Design and
Implementation, pages 259–272, 2004. 2.4
[37] Jeff H. Perkins and Michael D. Ernst. Efficient incremental algorithms for
dynamic detection of likely invariants. In In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSOFT
12th Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering, pages 23–32, 2004.
5.1.1
[38] Ola Pettersson. Execution monitoring in robotics: A survey. Robotics and
Autonomous Systems, 53:73–88, 2005. 2.3
[39] The American Mathematical Society. The amsfonts package. Available at:
http://tug.ctan.org/cgi-bin/ctanPackageInformation.py?id=amsfonts.
[40] Jinlin Yang, David Evans, Deepali Bhardwaj, Thirumalesh Bhat, and Manuvir
Das. Perracotta: mining temporal API rules from imperfect traces. In ICSE,
pages 282–291, 2006. 2.2

98

Appendix A
Grammar of Configuration File
The configuration file in XML format, where the root element is the tag himROSi.
There are 21 tags at all, which are imROS, scope, publish, topic, call, service, param
arch, temporal, pattern, condition, value, detect, bag, check, success, f ail, monitor,
block, action, and violation. Table A.1 shows the details of the grammar.
Note that some tags have the ID attributes, which are used to refer them in the
other tags. To differentiate them, except for the condition tag, all IDs are lower
case alphabet characters, and the ID for condition is a numeric character. So the
attribute events is a string with the lowercase characters separated by commas, and
the attribute conds is a string with the numeric characters separated by commas.
The regular expression in the pattern tag are composed with lowercase characters
referring specific events or capital characters representing any events declared in
the events attribute.
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Tag

Attributes

imROS

project

scope

-

publish
topic
call
service
param

id
relative
conds
id
conds

Elements
scope
detect
check
monitor
publish
call
param
arch
temporal
condition
topic
param
service
param
-

Comments
Root element. Only one exists.

It defines the scope of the invariant inference.

It defines a publishing event to be monitored. The first
topic element is the monitored topic, and other topics are
relative topics user declared explicitly.
Its content is the global name of the topic.
Its elements are one service to be monitored.

pattern

id
conds
id
events
conds
-

condition

id

value

-

-

detect
bag

inv
-

check

inv

bag
success
fail

success

-

-

fail

-

monitor

launch
inv

block
action
violation

block

-

-

Its content is the topics that the monitor will block the
publishing messages if they violate any invariant.

action

id

topic
service
value

It defines an action in terms of publishing a message or
call a service.

violation

-

-

Its content defines which action(s) will be taken at the
violation(s).

arch
temporal

-

Its content is the global name of the service.
Its content is the global name of the parameter.
Its content is the architecture variables to be monitored.

pattern
topic
value

Its content is a regular expression.
It defines a condition in terms of the message value.
Its content is an expression on the field of a message or
the name of another topic.
It defines the input bag files and the output invariant file.
Its content is the directory the bag file(s).
It defines the successful runs and the failed runs used for
the invariant classification.
Its content is the directory the bag file(s) of the successful
cases.
Its content is the directory the bag file(s) of the failed cases.
It defines how to generate the monitor.

Table A.1: Grammar of Configration File

